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Reconciling Federal Asset Forfeitures
and Drug Offense Sentencing
Sandra Guerra*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 1990, Richard Lyle Austin met a police agent at
Austin's auto body shop. The two men agreed that Austin would
sell the agent some cocaine. Austin walked from the shop to his
mobile home and returned with two grams of cocaine that he
intended to sell to the agent. Austin was arrested. The next
day, law enforcement authorities searched the mobile home and
auto body shop and recovered "small amounts of marijuana and
cocaine, a .22 caliber revolver, drug paraphernalia, and approxi-
mately $4,700 in cash."1
Until the "war on drugs" reforms of the 1980s, this offender
would have faced only moderately serious punishment.2 These
facts do not suggest that Austin was a "drug kingpin" or even a
mid-level trafficker. By all accounts, Austin was a small-time,
street-level dealer. For his criminal misdeeds, a South Dakota
state court convicted Austin of possession with intent to sell co-
caine and sentenced him to seven years incarceration. 3 In other
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School, 1988. The author owes a debt of gratitude to Irene Merker Rosenberg
and David Crump of the University of Houston Law Center; Deborah Young of
Emory Law School; Ronald F. Wright, Jr. of Wake Forest Law School; and Ja-
mie Dershowitz for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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1. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993). Although police
found a revolver in the home, id., there is no indication in either the Supreme
Court or Eighth Circuit cases that Austin was considered dangerous. Id.;
United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992).
2. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 prescribed some of the the harshest
drug offense penalties to date. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); see
Steven Wisotski, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HAST. L.J. 889, 904 (1987).
3. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
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words, the sentencing court determined that seven years was
adequate punishment for the crime. Yet after his conviction, the
federal government also initiated civil forfeiture proceedings in
order to seize both his mobile home and his auto body shop on
the ground that these properties "facilitated" the drug deal.4
Thus, in addition to a seven-year prison term, the federal gov-
ernment deprived Austin of virtually all of his assets.
During the October 1992 term, the Supreme Court heard
Austin's case. The Court determined that the seizure of his
home and his legitimate business enterprise constituted punish-
ment for a crime and therefore should be subject to the con-
straints of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "excessive
fines."5 This case and four others the Court heard during the
same term limit the reach of federal drug asset forfeitures. 6 The
Austin case in particular indicates the Court's apparent view
that the cumulative effect of criminal and civil punishments on
drug offenders deserves reassessment.
The present movement to reform drug sentencing focuses
exclusively on criminal sentencing provisions. Some federal dis-
trict court judges and other observers have loudly protested the
harshness of the mandatory prison sentences that drug offend-
ers receive. 7 For its part, the Justice Department has demon-
4. Id. Federal asset forfeiture laws permit the government to seize
properties that "facilitate" a drug law violation. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988);
see also infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (addressing punitive nature of
various provisions of § 881).
5. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
6. The Supreme Court ruled against the government in four of the five
forfeiture cases decided this term. United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 495 (1993) (holding that "[absent exigent circum-
stances, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford notice and
an opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfei-
ture"); Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993) (holding that
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil forfeiture penal-
ties); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1131-34 (1993)
(concluding that owner's ignorance of the source of the funds she used to
purchase real property is a defense to a civil forfeiture proceeding against that
property); Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 562 (1992)
(holding that government cannot deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction by
transferring proceeds from forfeited property out of judicial district). The fifth
case, Alexander v. United States, is a criminal forfeiture case in which the Court
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision in Austin. 113 S.
Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993).
7. Of course, many judges resent their loss of discretion in sentencing.
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 924-25 (1991) (discussing how some
judges defy the guidelines); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YAIE L.J.
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strated a new willingness to reconsider federal drug policies.8
Yet the dialogue of sentencing reform omits any consideration of
the use of civil asset forfeitures as a means of punishing drug
offenders. A complete assessment of drug sentencing must take
into account the full extent of drug offense punishment by in-
cluding both traditional criminal sentences and the civil forfei-
ture of assets such as homes and businesses.
The civil forfeiture process, upon which federal prosecutors
heavily rely, offers numerous procedural and financial benefits
to law enforcement over criminal sentencing.9 In fact, the gov-
1681, 1685 (1992) (noting that the "guidelines have provoked dismay and eva-
sion in the federal courts and the bar"). Many judges complain specifically
about the harshness of sentences under the guidelines and, in particular, the
harshness of drug sentences. See U.S. District Senior Judge Whitman Knapp,
The War on Drugs, Address Before the Merchants Club in New York City (Mar.
24, 1993), in 5 FED. SENTENCING REP., MarJApr. 1993, at 294-97 (discussing the
futility of the drug war and its "terrible judicial result" on sentencing); Memo-
randum from Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. District Senior Judge for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York, to the Judges and Magistrates of the Eastern District of New
York (Apr. 12, 1993), in 5 FED. SENTENCiNG REP., Mar./Apr. 1993, at 298 (re-
moving himself, as has Judge Knapp, from sentencing in drug cases); see also
Sentencing Commission's Symposium on Drugs and Violence Puts Emphasis on
Prevention, 53 Camn. L. REP. (BNA) No. 12, at 1265 (June 23, 1993) (summariz-
ing discussions by symposium speakers criticizing federal mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses); Cris Carmody, Revolt to Sentencing Is Gaining Mo-
mentum, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1993, at 10 (reporting that Judges Knapp and
Weinstein refuse to take drug cases because they believe the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines are too harsh); David Margolick, Full Spectrum of Judicial Crit-
ics Assail Prison Sentencing Guides; 5-Year Effort Is Called Hobgoblin of U.S.
Courts, N.Y. Tnils, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al (discussing widespread judicial criti-
cism of the guidelines); Jonathan M. Moses, Many Judges Skirt Sentencing
Guidelines, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1993, at B-12 (reporting some judges' reluc-
tance to apply stiff sentences that the guidelines require in drug cases);
Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission's Drug Guidelines: Courier Cases
Where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP., SeptlOct.
1990, at 63 (noting several federal judges who have publicly complained about
the harshness of the guidelines and one who resigned in protest).
8. The change in attitude may simply reflect the changing of the guard
that occurred when the new administration appointed a new Attorney General,
Janet Reno. She announced as one of her first policy statements that she will
reconsider the way in which minor drug offenders are sentenced in federal
court. Stephen Labaton, Reno Moving to Reverse Stiff Sentencing Rule for Mi-
nor Drug Crimes, N.Y. TinEs, May 5, 1993, at A19; see also Joseph B. Treaster,
Clinton Altering Nation's Tactics in Drug Battle, N.Y. TmEs, Oct. 21, 1993, at
Al (reporting that President Clinton planned to focus national drug strategy on
treatment for hard-core drug users and social programs rather than on interdic-
tion of drugs).
9. See William P. Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Consta-
ble Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the
Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1313-32 (1992) (concluding the
civil forfeiture process not only provides monetary incentives for law enforce-
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ernment's advantages so overwhelm property owners that com-
mentators have long criticized the perceived constitutional and
policy shortcomings of civil forfeiture. 10 Drug offenders, how-
ment but also enables the government to take advantage of a lower evidentiary
standard and broad civil discovery rules); Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Bur-
dens of Proof And the War on Drugs, 83 J. CRaM. L. & CRmNOLOGY 274, 279-86
(1992) (outlining briefly the procedural steps for affecting a forfeiture).
The Justice Department strongly advocates the use of the civil asset forfei-
ture process and encourages states to develop similar statutes for reasons of
expediency. See 1991 ANN. REP. OF THE DEPT OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFErrURE
PROGRAM 12 (hereinafter 1991 ANN. REP.) ("[States] should allow the use of civil
proceedings, so that prosecutors need not wait for the conclusion of an often
lengthy criminal trial before forfeiting assets obviously derived from or con-
nected with the drug trade."); see also part 1.C (addressing the government's
advantages and interests in civil forfeiture of drug assets).
10. For a discussion of civil forfeiture, see generally Michael Goldsmith &
Mark J. Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for
Further Law Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254 (1989) (proposing legislative reform
of forfeiture laws to better protect the rights of third parties); Craig W. Palm,
RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When Is Everything Too Much?,
53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1991) (arguing that amending RICO to give the courts
discretion in forfeiture cases would avoid Eighth Amendment concerns); Stahl,
supra note 9 (arguing that forfeiture constitutes criminal punishment and that
the government must therefore prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt); Alok
Ahuja, Civil Forfeiture, Warrantless Property Seizures, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 5 YAE L. & PoL'Y REv. 428 (1987) (advocating strict application of Fourth
Amendment standards in the context of civil forfeiture); Mark A. Jankowski,
Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to
Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165 (1990) (advocating a nar-
rower construction of the relation-back doctrine and an amendment to the inno-
cent-ownership defense to promote consistent and fair application of forfeiture
laws); Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property For-
feiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 471 (1989) (encouraging consistent treatment by suggesting a broad inter-
pretation of the innocent owner defense); Nelson, supra note 9 (suggesting a
rule that would prohibit the forfeiture of assets taken in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion
of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 UNiv. MiLmi L.
REV. 911 (1991) (endorsing the proposition that "draconian" civil forfeiture
laws violate defendants' due process rights); Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, Real
Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure
to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REv. 217 (1992) (discussing
need for a forfeiture proposal that would balance the interests of the both the
government and the innocent owners of forfeited property); Michael Schecter,
Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1151
(1990) (arguing that drug forfeiture statutes are criminal and proposing reform
that provides adequate due process and reduces harsh results); Sean D. Smith,
Comment, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes
Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 303 (1988) (defend-
ing expansive interpretation of federal forfeiture provisions against Eighth
Amendment challenges); James B. Speta, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil
Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amend-
ment, 89 MicH. L. REv. 165 (1990) (finding constitutional need to narrow the
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ever, also face stiff criminal penalties. In effect, Congress has
created parallel systems for the disposition of drug cases: one
civil and one criminal. The civil forfeiture process serves as an
adjunct or as an alternative to the criminal justice system. In
some cases, the government may pursue both civil forfeiture and
criminal prosecution. By pursuing both civil and criminal ac-
tions, the government may inflict punishment on drug offenders
twice because criminal courts do not factor into the sentencing
calculus the loss suffered from the forfeiture action. 1
Changes in the operation of the civil forfeiture process, such
as those required by Austin, may make that process, standing
alone, more fair because courts will measure the value of for-
feited properties against the severity of the offense. Such
changes, however, will not promote rational, fair treatment of
drug offenders overall. The relationship between the dual crimi-
nal and civil sources of punishment for drug offenders has
evaded scrutiny because, until Austin, courts did not consider
civil forfeitures as punishment, but merely as remedial meas-
ures. By structuring the forfeiture process as a civil action, Con-
gress created a system that courts treat as distinct and
ostensibly unrelated to the criminal sentencing system.
This Article urges Congress and courts to reconsider and
reconcile the dual measures employed against drug offenders.
Civil forfeiture practice may be a legitimate and necessary re-
sponse in some cases, such as when the drug offender is outside
the jurisdictional reach of the government, which was the origi-
nal purpose of civil asset forfeiture,1 2 or to recover contraband,
instrumentalities, or ill-gotten gains. When the government
reaches beyond this limited set of cases, however, it moves into
the realm of punishment for crime. As such, Congress and
courts should factor this punishment into the sentencing deci-
sion to promote rational and proportional sentencing. i3
scope of drug forfeiture); Jack Yoskowitz, The War on the Poor: Civil Forfeiture
of Public Housing, 25 COLmi. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 567 (1992) (arguing that the
in rem nature of civil forfeiture is a legal fiction that should be abolished).
11. For a discussion of the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy implications
of punitive forfeitures followed by criminal sentences, see infra notes 182-196
and accompanying text.
12. Originally, the civil asset forfeiture process developed in admiralty law
was intended to exact punishment on, and recover restitution for victims from,
foreign owners of ships who could not be brought into court. See infra notes
169-174 and accompanying text (discussing early forfeiture statutes).
13. For a discussion of proportionality as a goal at sentencing, see infra
part H.B.
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Ideally, Congress should abolish the practice of imposing
punitive forfeitures in civil forfeiture actions. Alternatively, the
United States Sentencing Commission could amend the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provisions on fines and forfeitures to re-
quire judges to factor the consequences of civil forfeiture actions
into their sentencing decisions. Finally, even without action by
Congress or the Commission, individual sentencing judges could
exercise their authority to depart downward from Guidelines
sentences on account of punitive civil forfeitures, and they could
utilize criminal forfeitures as a means of tempering prison
sentences.
By acknowledging that punitive forfeitures are part of crim-
inal sentences, criminal courts would accomplish two important
goals. They would be able to better tailor the criminal sentences
to fit the crimes. A sentencing judge probably would not find
that a small-time dealer like Austin deserves to be deprived of
all his assets. Criminal courts also would be able to reduce their
reliance on imprisonment as a primary form of punishment. In-
stead, courts could impose financial penalties and punitive for-
feitures in combination with shorter prison sentences. As drug
offenses are the most vigorously prosecuted offenses, these
changes would have a significant impact on the administration
of criminal justice in federal courts. 14
Part II of this Article examines the parallel systems for pun-
ishing drug offenders by criminal sentencing as well as the civil
forfeiture process. This section describes the civil forfeiture pro-
cess and examines its advantages to prosecution and law en-
forcement. Part III of this Article highlights two significant
recent decisions that signal a change in the Court's previously
supportive view of civil forfeiture: Austin v. United States' 5 and
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave. 16 These cases focus on two
fundamental penological limiting principles: the mental ele-
ment of a criminal act and proportionality in sentencing.
Neither principle previously has played a part in the civil forfei-
14. A number of measures reflect the high priority the federal government
has placed on the prosecution of drug offenses since 1980. The Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics reports that between 1980 and 1990, the number of drug offend-
ers convicted in federal courts more than tripled, while the number of non-drug
convictions rose by only 32%. Douglas C. McDonald et al., Federal Sentencing
in Transition, 1986-90, BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REP. 4 (1992).
Of the 37,725 offenders receiving prison sentences in federal courts in 1992,
15,544 were convicted of drug trafficking. 1992 U.S. SENTENCING COMe'N ANN.
REP. app. B.
15. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
16. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
810 [Vol. 78:805
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ture process. The judicial pronouncements will work some basic
changes in the civil forfeiture process that will reshape it to bet-
ter conform to the criminal process paradigm. Yet these adjust-
ments are insufficient if the goal is to rationalize drug offense
sentencing. Even if the civil process can protect drug offenders
from excessive or arbitrary punishment, imposition of punish-
ment through the combination of civil and criminal actions can
produce a package of punishments that may far exceed that
which is justified by the severity of the infraction.
In Part IV, this Article suggests some statutory reforms
that would consolidate the punishment of drug offenders into a
single, comprehensive criminal sentencing proceeding. Purely
remedial forfeitures could continue to be brought in civil actions,
but punitive forfeitures would best be sought after conviction in
a criminal proceeding. This section attempts to balance the in-
terests of law enforcement in obtaining asset forfeitures against
the sentencing concerns that current civil forfeiture practices
raise. This Article concludes that some aspects of the civil sys-
tem can be transferred to the criminal system without jeopardiz-
ing law enforcement's ability to investigate and disable complex
drug operations. Overall, the legitimate and pressing needs of
law enforcement and the goals of fair sentencing can both be
satisfied.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE AS
A PARALLEL SYSTEM OF PUNISHMENT
Traditionally, the State has brought its power to bear
against individuals who violate the penal laws of the jurisdic-
tion.17 Upon conviction, courts sentence individuals to a punish-
ment-involving a deprivation of life, liberty, or property-
consistent with various factors that courts have long considered
relevant to the sentencing decision.' 8 In most cases, this process
17. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSMLTY (1968)
(discussing the philosophy of penal law); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LnvITS OF
THE CRmINAL SANCTIoN (1968) (describing the rationale, procedure, and limita-
tions of criminal law); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L.
& CONTEmnw. PROBS. 401 (1958) (pointing out the complexities and competing
principles within criminal law).
18. Under the traditional indeterminate sentencing system that federal
judges used until the late 1980s, courts had broad discretion in deciding
whether certain factors were relevant to the sentencing decision and how much
weight to accord them. Most courts agreed that the severity of the offense was
extremely significant. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)
(noting that indeterminate sentencing requires courts to look at "the fullest in-
formation possible concerning the defendants life and characteristics"). Of-
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works well in the sense that it permits society to pursue the
goals of the criminal justice system by publicly sanctioning the
individuals responsible for the violations.
In other cases, this process does not work well, namely, in
those cases in which law enforcement cannot bring individuals
to justice because it cannot bring them into the jurisdiction.
Originally, the creation of civil in rem forfeitures gave the gov-
ernment a tool to punish individuals over whom courts could not
obtain in personam jurisdiction, but whose property was found
within the jurisdiction. 19 In the earliest forfeiture cases involv-
ing admiralty issues, courts determined that the arrest and pun-
ishment of the individuals on the vessel would be ineffectual as
a deterrent to smuggling because the vessel, if returned to its
foreign owners, would simply make its way back into the coun-
try with a new crew.20 The need to confiscate the contraband as
well as the offending vessel was manifest if the government in-
tended to sanction the foreign owners.
Over the years, Congress expanded the scope of civil in rem
forfeitures beyond that which is justified by its original purpose.
fense severity, however, varied according to the circumstances. A man who
intentionally killed his wife to collect life insurance and marry another woman
would be considered the worst type of killer. On the other hand, a man who
intentionally killed his wife because she had a terminal illness and was suffer-
ing greatly would be treated with compassion by most judges. Courts also con-
sidered offender characteristics such as family background, employment, age,
and education. These characteristics were generally considered relevant to an
offender's potential to be rehabilitated. See id. at 247-50.
For an insightful analysis of federal district court decision-making in a
study of white collar criminal cases prior to the enactment of determinate sen-
tencing via the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see STANTON WHEELER ET AL.,
SITrING IN JUDGmENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988).
For a discussion of post-guidelines sentencing factors, see Barbara S. Meierhof-
fer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentencing, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 367 (1992) (evaluating the results of a study of drug offenders
sentenced from January 1984 through 1990).
19. If jurisdiction is based on the court's power over property within its
territory, the action is called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 199 (1977). The state in which the property is located has exclusive
sovereignty over that property. Id. at 200. In rem actions will proceed regard-
less of the owner's location. Id. at 199-200. In in rem actions, courts follow the
guidelines of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Under
this standard, courts must evaluate all assertions of state jurisdiction according
to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" and the complainant
must have at least "minimum contacts" with the forum state. Id. at 316-19; see
also infra part IV.A.2 (discussing lack of in personam jurisdiction).
20. The Department of Justice uses this example in its discussion of the
need for asset forfeitures. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 7. The report, how-
ever, does not offer a theoretical justification for civil forfeitures in cases in
which the government can bring individuals into custody.
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Congress has adapted this expanded form of civil in rem forfei-
ture to fight the drug industry by permitting forfeiture for any
felony violation of federal drug laws.21 In effect, Congress has
chosen to resort to a parallel system for punishing drug offend-
ers: criminal sentencing of the individual and a civil forfeiture
process by which a person can be dispossessed of any property
involved in the drug offense. 22
In retrospect, one can understand why asset forfeitures be-
came a central focus of law enforcement activities in the drug
war. Students of drug crimes have long recognized that, unlike
most criminals, drug offenders are part of a profit-making "in-
dustry."23 The lifeblood of the industry is the money that it gen-
erates. How better, then, to deal with drug offenders than to
deprive them, and their associates, of the fruits of their labor. It
was only a matter of time before Congress sought to attack the
economic base of the drug industry. 24
21. The growth of federal drug laws has expanded the reach of the forfei-
ture laws. With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress dramatically in-
creased the scope of activity that federal criminal law covers. Pub. L. No. 100-
690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). Much of the activity encompassed by the 1988 stat-
ute had previously been addressed at the state level and has no obvious federal
interest. The provision making it a federal crime to possess even a small
amount of a controlled substance provides a stark example. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)
(1988); see also Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme
Court's Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. Cmi. L. 219, 257 (1992) (pro-
viding examples of harsh drug penalties). Federal drug law now also doubles
and triples the penalities for drug offenders if their crimes involve youths or
pregnant women. 21 U.S.C. § 845b(d), Cf) (1988). The statute reaches the dis-
tribution of a controlled substance to persons under 21 years of age, 21 U.S.C.
§ 845 (1988), and the distribution or manufacture of a controlled substance
within one thousand feet of any school-public or private, grade school through
university level-or within one hundred feet of any playground, public or pri-
vate youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility. 21 U.S.C.
§ 845a(a) (1988).
22. Although a criminal forfeiture process also exists, 21 U.S.C. § 853
(1988), the government uses it less. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying
text (discussing the governments preference of civil over criminal forfeiture).
23. See, e.g., Gerald T. McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation
of a Dangerous Drug, 58 CoRNEmLL L. REv. 537, 547-549 (1973) (addressing the
distribution and sale of heroin and cocaine arriving from sources abroad into
the United States); James E. Gierach, An Economic Attack on illicit Drugs,
A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 95 (encouraging an economic and medically based na-
tional drug policy).
24. At the same time that Congress enacted provisions to deprive drug
traders of their profits, the legislature also enacted a similar provision to attack
the economic base of organized crime, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(the progenitor to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") statute). Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
813
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Having determined that financial penalties, even more than
deprivations of liberty, would work most effectively to deter the
drug trade, Congress could have proceeded in at least three
ways: it might have opted to stiffen the fine provisions of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines applicable to drug offenses; it
might have created a sweeping criminal forfeiture process; or it
might have adopted a process separate and apart from the crimi-
nal process altogether, such as the in rem civil forfeiture action.
Either of the first two options-fines or criminal forfeiture-
could be imposed only after a criminal conviction as part of the
sentence for the crime. Apparently, these options were less at-
tractive than the civil forfeiture action, which requires neither a
criminal conviction nor, until recently, financial deprivation lim-
ited by an assessment of the severity of the offense. 25
At the time of sentencing for a criminal offense, courts need
not take into account the value of the assets the government has
seized or plans to seize through forfeiture. Sentencing may pro-
ceed as though this fact were irrelevant to the sentencing deter-
mination. The sentencing court may decide, by means of strict
sentencing guidelines, 26 what punishment is proportional to the
seriousness of the offense, without decreasing the criminal pun-
ishment by the amount of punishment the defendant will face in
the forfeiture action. Although many have criticized the legal
fiction that in rem civil forfeiture cases use to treat property as
the guilty party, an even more significant legal fiction is that
which allows courts to ignore the fact of forfeiture as if it was not
one of the punitive measures taken against the individual. As-
suming arguendo that some civil forfeitures constitute punish-
ment, a criminal sentence imposed without regard to the
Over time, however, the motivation behind forfeitures shifted from attack-
ing the most powerful drug dealers to amassing the greatest revenues for law
enforcement coffers, no matter how insignificant the alleged drug deal. For a
thorough discussion of law enforcement goals in pursuing asset forfeitures, see
Nelson, supra note 9 at 1324-1333; see also infra notes 73-83 and accompanying
text.
25. See infra part III.B (discussing the Austin decision's proportionality
requirement).
26. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, adopted in 1987, place limits on
federal courts' discretion in sentencing. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COM-
MISSION, GUInELINES MAUAL (1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.I. The adoption of
the Guidelines has radically changed federal sentencing practice from the inde-
terminate sentencing model that preceded it. See generally Stephen Breyer,
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988) (providing historical analysis of the guide-
lines and the changes in sentencing they have created).
[Vol. 78:805
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punishment inflicted through civil forfeiture is a fortiori exces-
sive and disproportionate to the offense.
It is to this set of cases-those in which the government
prosecutes an individual in criminal court for the same conduct
that resulted in forfeiture-that reformers should focus their at-
tention. To promote the Federal Sentencing Guideline's goals of
proportionality and fairness, the extent of punishment inflicted
through forfeiture should mitigate the criminal sentence.27 This
country has never considered any crime so outrageous as to obvi-
ate the need for limits on the severity of punishment in propor-
tion to the severity of the crime.
A. HISTORY OF CML ASSET FoRFEITUREs AS PUNISHMENT
In general, law enforcement authorities have long pursued
civil asset forfeitures for many types of offenses because of the
advantages the process offers. Civil forfeiture actions give the
government the authority to seize and dispose of property in-
volved in a criminal offense and retain the proceeds from the
sale of the asset for government use.28 Civil forfeiture actions
proceed against properties, based on the fiction that the assets
27. Indeed, forfeiture actions themselves were not designed to mete out
criminal sentences. Until Austin, the forfeiture process did not include a pro-
portionality requirement. The Austin decision now requires courts to weigh the
value of assets forfeited against the seriousness of the criminal offense alleged,
as they would in a sentencing proceeding, but Austin does nothing to remedy
the double punishment problem when the government both forfeits property
and exacts a sentence in criminal court as well. See infra part III.B (analyzing
the Austin decision).
28. Federal law provides for the forfeiture of assets resulting from a variety
of other crimes besides drug offenses. See, e.g., 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at
29 (noting the Immigration and Naturalization Service forfeits vehicles seized
at the border due to immigration law violations). The thrust of the federal asset
forfeiture programs, however, is aimed at drug offenders and racketeering ac-
tivity. Commonly used forfeiture statutes include the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803, 84 Stat. 922, 937 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955 (1988)) (civil forfeiture for gambling violations); the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 943 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (criminal forfeiture for
RICO violations); the Money and Finance Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 5317, 96
Stat. 877, 998 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992))
(civil forfeiture for money laundering violations); and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-35 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (civil forfeiture for money laundering vio-
lations and felony drug violations against foreign nations); see also 1991 ANN.
REP., supra note 9, at 107 app I. For a thorough discussion of the range of
government imposed punitive civil sanctions, see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J.
1795 (1992).
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in question are themselves "guilty,"29 and as if the owners had
no interest in their disposition. Actions are thus styled as
"United States v. A Certain Piece of Property," not as "United
States v. An Individual." Deeming inanimate property to be a
party to a lawsuit allows the government to avoid providing
property owners with many of the protections the Constitution
affords to individuals charged with crimes.30
Of course, contraband, drug proceeds, and genuine "instru-
mentalities" such as weapons or drug equipment, should be
civilly forfeitable. The civil forfeiture process gives the govern-
ment the means to expeditiously dispossess suspected criminals
of illegal, illegally-used, or illegally-obtained items. Courts,
however, have a long history of imposing civil forfeiture even in
cases in which the property cannot be characterized as contra-
band, instrumentality, or criminal proceeds. In such cases, the
government stands on shaky ground if the argument for an ex-
peditious process is one of necessity. When the government goes
beyond dispossessing criminals of illegal or dangerous sub-
stances or criminal proceeds, it moves into the realm of punish-
ment of crime.
29. The rule was first enunciated in United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). The Court stated that, "[t]he vessel which commits
the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to
which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the charac-
ter or conduct of the owner." Id. at 233. This legal fiction persists in civil forfei-
ture law to date. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
680-684 (1974); see also 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 7-8; Terrance G. Reed,
American Forfeiture Law: Property Owners Meet the Prosecutor, Poiy ANALY-
sis (CATO Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 29, 1992, at 3, 6-7 (discussing the
fiction of proceeding against property).
30. See generally Stahl, supra note 9 (arguing that the government's bur-
den of proof violates the Due Process Clause); Ahuja, supra note 10, (discussing
the inadequate protection that courts afford to Fourth Amendment rights); Nel-
son, supra note 9 (same); Schecter, supra note 10 (concluding that civil forfeit-
ures violate the Due Process Clause); Yoskowitz, supra note 10 (asserting that
civil forfeitures violate the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment).
The Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings. Even
in criminal forfeitures, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not bar forfeiture of assets that would be used to pay bona
fide attorney's fees. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); see also Mor-
gan Cloud, Government Intrusions Into the Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Impact of Fee Forfeitures on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of
Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY L. J. 817 (1987) (discussing the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel in the context of fee forfeitures); Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting De-
fense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individ-
ual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1 (1987) (same).
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The constitutionality of using a civil process to punish for
crimes is considered well settled, although upon closer scrutiny
the historical basis for punitive forfeitures seems less obvious.
An important early forfeiture case, Miller v. United States,,3
that the Court later ignored, squarely addressed the constitu-
tionality of civil forfeiture to punish crimes against the sover-
eign. In this case, the government initiated an action to forfeit
property of a Northern rebel during the Civil War. The nature
of the disagreement between the majority and the dissenting
Justices lay not in whether the Constitution permits forfeitures
to be used to punish for crimes but rather in the source of Con-
gress's authority to permit forfeiture for treason. The majority
contended that Congress had exercised its war powers in enact-
ing the forfeiture statute at issue.32 Justice Field's dissenting
opinion urged that the statute did no more than to punish the
crime of treason, an exercise of Congress's municipal (or police)
power.33
Both the majority and the dissenters agreed on the more
important issue for present purposes, that is, whether a civil for-
feiture process that merely serves as an alternative form of
criminal prosecution violates the Constitution.3 4 Justice Strong
wrote for the majority:
The [plaintiffs] objection starts with the assumption that the purpose
of the acts was to punish offences against the sovereignty of the United
States, and that they are merely statutes against crimes. If this were a
correct assumption, if the act of 1861, and the fifth, sixth, and seventh
sections of the act of July 17, 1862, were municipal regulations only,
there would be force in the objection that Congress has disregarded the
restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution.3 5
In light of this passage, one might have expected the Court
to reject, or at least carefully analyze, forfeiture laws applied for
the sole purpose of punishing a crime. Instead, in Dobbins's Dis-
tillery v. United States,36 the Court subsequently upheld the
constitutionality of a forfeiture law against a claim that the
action was of a criminal nature and thus could not be executed
except upon conviction. In a formalistic analysis, the Court
found the proceeding to be of a civil nature in that it "d[idl not
involve the personal conviction of the wrong-doer for the offense
charged... [and] the conviction of the wrong-doer [had to] be ob-
31. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871).
32. Id. at 305.
33. Id. at 314-321 (Field, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 304.
35. Id.
36. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
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tained, if at all, in another and wholly independent
proceeding."37
Since Dobbin's Distillery, the Supreme Court has not seri-
ously questioned the constitutionality of civil forfeiture statutes
that aim to punish for criminal wrongdoing. In a number of de-
cisions the Court wavered, recognizing the criminal nature of
forfeiture actions and applying certain constitutional provisions
to them.38 In most cases, however, the Court has maintained
the fiction that the action is civil and proceeds against "guilty"
property.39
B. SECTION 881 FoR.FEITUEs As PuNIsHMENT
When Congress enacted the civil drug asset forfeiture law,
21 U.S.C. § 881, as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970,40 the law made assets of both a
remedial and punitive nature civilly forfeitable. Section 881 al-
lowed the forfeiture of contraband, containers, and conveyances
used to transport the contraband.41 Contraband forfeitures are
clearly remedial in that they "remove[ ] dangerous or illegal
items from society."42 The government should not need to ob-
tain a criminal conviction to confiscate contraband because a
37. Id. at 399; see also Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921) ("[W]hether the reason for [civil forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to now be
displaced.").
38. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (declaring that for-
feitures for criminal offenses are of a "quasi-criminal nature," and the Fourth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination should
apply); United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556
(1983) (Fifth Amendment speedy trial guarantee); United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 722 (1971) (Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 701 (1965) (Fourth Amendment); see also Stahl, supra note 9, at 294-
301 (discussing the historical distinction between civil and criminal forfeitures);
Schecter, supra note 10, at 1159 (discussing the Court's inconsistency in recog-
nizing the criminal nature of forfeiture actions).
39. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
684-85 (1974) (citing cases involving "guilty" property); Goldsmith-Grant v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921) ("Congress... ascrib[es] to the property
a certain personality .... ").
40. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 1314-
17 (discussing the development of civil forfeiture statute § 881).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
42. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2811 (1993) (citing United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984)).
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drug dealer should not be allowed to retain it under any
circumstances.
The same is true for the forfeiture of proceeds of drug activ-
ity made forfeitable under § 881(a)(6).43 The forfeiture of money
or assets traceable to drug transactions should not be considered
punishment because the drug offender was never entitled to
them in the first place. Forfeiture of drug proceeds merely puts
criminals in the same place they would have been had they not
committed the crime. If the government can establish that drug
proceeds are illegitimately acquired, the person possessing them
has no standing to complain of unfair punishment if the funds
are forfeited; their removal is not punishment.44
If forfeiture was limited to seizing the instrumentalities or
"ill-gotten gains" of notorious drug dealers, the theoretical juxta-
position of civil process and the criminal justice system would
attract little criticism. The law, however, places no such restric-
tion on law enforcement. Given the long historical practice of
seizing conveyances, 45 it is not surprising that such a provision
appeared in the earliest version of § 881. As the Court affirmed
in Austin, the forfeiture of conveyances that transport con-
traband, such as cars, trucks, and yachts, is punitive, not
remedial.46
43. In 1978 Congress extended the reach of the law by authorizing the for-
feiture of "[a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished.., in exchange for a controlled substance... or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation...." Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
(1988)).
Approving the use of a civil process for the forfeiture of these proceeds does
not preclude an assessment of the process used. In particular, many authors
have criticized the burdens of proof and other constitutional issues relating to
the civil forfeiture process. For a sampling of these criticisms, see supra notes
9-10.
44. This provision would not allow forfeiture of drug proceeds that an inno-
cent merchant possessed, such as one who sold something to a drug dealer with-
out knowing the source of the buyer's money. In that situation, the government
could seize the thing that the drug dealer had purchased, but not the money
that he had given to the innocent seller. Indeed, even if the innocent person
had received the money as a gift, the money is not forfeitable if the person did
not have knowledge of its source. See infra part HI-A (discussing the innocent
owner defense).
45. From its inception in admiralty, forfeitures have reached instruments
of conveyance such as ships, and at a later point in history, automobiles and
airplanes. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text (discussing the
seizure of conveyances used to transport contraband).
46. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn-
sylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)) (reasoning that because "instruments" of
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In 1984 Congress greatly increased the possibilities for pun-
ishment by making forfeitable "[a]ll real property . . . in the
whole of any lot or tract of land... which is used, or intended to
be used.., to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a [con-
trolled substance] violation... ."47 A broad reading of this pro-
vision has enabled law enforcement to take property based on
even the most tenuous connection to a drug transaction, such as
property that serves as the location of a drug deal. Prior to the
Austin decision, the government often took large tracts of land,
buildings including homes, and legitimate business enterprises,
on the ground that a drug transaction took place on the prop-
erty.48 The value of the property seized bore no relation to the
level of culpability.
In response to numerous reports of abuse,49 Congress en-
acted a recent amendment that provides a defense to property
owners who do not know their property was used to facilitate a
drug offense. 50 Remarkably, this is a novel defense not tradi-
tionally provided. Further changes are in order, but efforts at
reform would be deficient if reformers do not carefully examine
the interests of prosecutors and law enforcement agencies in
pursuing civil forfeitures as a weapon in fighting drug crime.
drug trade are not necessarily themselves contraband, their forfeiture must be
punitive).
47. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 306, 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)).
As the statute clearly states, the value of the property is not considered in rela-
tion to the seriousness of the particular violation committed, rather all of the
property is subject to forfeiture for any violation. Id.
Property found in other countries may also be subject to civil forfeiture if
the foreign country is willing to transfer the property to the United States. This
practice is rapidly growing. See 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 43-47.
48. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 1314-17; Stahl, supra note 9, at 278.
49. Many articles and editorials have criticized the abuses of the forfeiture
program. See, e.g., Cris Carmody et al., Congress Hears Charges of Forfeiture
Abuse, NATVL L.J., Oct. 12, 1992, at 5 (reporting alleged abuses in the Justice
Department's Asset Forfeiture Program); Stephen Labaton, Seized Property in
Crime Cases Causes Concern, N.Y. Tnrms, May 31, 1993, at Al ("[t]he seizing of
suspects' property ... is out of control"); Terrance G. Reed, Forfeiture Run
Amok: Some Officials Are Using Legal Tactic as a Tool of Social Engineering,
L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 17, 1992, at 6 ("[F]orfeiture law has quickly become the
darling of law enforcement .... "); Drug Bust: Federal Asset-Forfeiture Law
Abused, Needs Reform, Hous. PosT, Sept. 7, 1992, at A32 (arguing that federal
forfeiture law needs reform).
50. See infra part llI.A (discussing the innocent owner defense).
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C. THE GovERNiENs ADVANTAGES AND INTERESTS
The government enjoys a number of advantages in civil as-
set forfeiture that make it more attractive to prosecutors than
its rarely-used criminal forfeiture counterpart. 5 ' Of utmost sig-
nificance is the fact that, unlike criminal forfeiture,52 civil forfei-
ture does not require a criminal conviction. 53 This difference is
important because in some cases illegitimate properties could
51. A criminal forfeiture process is authorized at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988):
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or sub-
chapter H of this chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision
of State law-
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any other person's property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such vio-
lation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall
forfeit, in addition to any property described in paragraph (1) or (2),
any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contractual
rights affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal enter-
prise. The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in
addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter, that the person forfeit to the United
States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine other-
wise authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or other
proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross
profits or other proceeds.
Id.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not add anything to the criminal for-
feiture provisions of § 853. The criminal forfeiture section of the guidelines
merely states that forfeiture of a defendant's property may occur "as provided
by statute." U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at § 5E1.4. An additional criminal drug
forfeiture provision, under § 848, provides for the forfeiture of the property of
one who engages in a "continuing criminal enterprise" (CCE). One engages in a
continuing criminal enterprise if he leads five or more other persons in commit-
ting a continuing series of federal drug felonies which produce substantial in-
come. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988).
52. Criminal forfeiture may only occur after conviction and only upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
53. One of the earliest forfeiture cases, The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1
(1827), makes clear that since the earliest days, civil in rem forfeiture actions
have not depended on criminal proceedings in personam. Justice Story wrote
for the court: "[T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand [sic] the
law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaf-
fected by any criminal proceeding in personam." Id. at 15 (italics in original).
Even at this early date, forfeiture was often used in lieu of or in addition to
criminal prosecution: "Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done at-
taches solely in rem, and there is no accompanying penalty inpersonam. Many
cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty." Id.
at 14-15 (italics in original).
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not be forfeited if a conviction were required. 54 In addition, the
government must show only probable cause, not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as criminal forfeiture requires, that the prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture because of its illegal nature or its use
in an unlawful manner.55 Once the government establishes
probable cause in a civil forfeiture, the burden shifts to the per-
son claiming an ownership interest in the property to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property was not used or
intended to be used to commit or facilitate a drug violation. 56
Until recently, § 881 also offered the advantage to the gov-
ernment of permitting the seizure of property before holding a
hearing on the propriety of the forfeiture and without giving no-
tice to the owner.57 The law still permits pre-conviction seizure,
however, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property held that the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require pre-
seizure notice and an adversary hearing to precede forfeiture of
all real property.58 The Court did not limit its ruling to residen-
tial properties,59 as had some lower courts. 60 In contrast, the
exceptions for pre-conviction seizure of property under criminal
forfeiture law are narrow.6' Thus, the civil forfeiture process
54. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
55. For a thorough discussion of burden of proof issues in civil drug asset
forfeitures, see Stahl, supra note 9, at 284-85, 291-94.
56. See United States v. Parcels of Real Property with Building, 913 F.2d 1
(lst Cir. 1990); see also Stahl, supra note 9, at 284-85 (discussing the burdens of
proof under § 881).
57. For a discussion of the seizure procedures of § 881, see Stahl, supra
note 9, at 279-81. Stahl's article, however, predates the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993), and the procedures will have to be modified in light of the Court's deci-
sion. See infra notes 58-59.
58. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 505.
59. Id.
60. See Stahl, supra note 9, at 281 n.34 (citing cases).
61. The procedures for seizure of forfeitable assets under § 853 are more
cumbersome for prosecutors and give defendants an opportunity to transfer or
hide assets prior to sentencing. Unlike the civil forfeiture process, assets may
not be seized prior to the issuance of a judicial forfeiture order. A restraining
order or injunction may be obtained by the government to preserve the property
for forfeiture. This may occur, however, only upon the filing of an indictment or
information, or prior to such a filing if the government meets the high burden of
demonstrating the necessity of the seizure. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988). A re-
straining order or injunction may be ordered if a court finds the following:
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will
prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will
result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of
the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and
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closes the window of opportunity for an accused drug dealer to
hide or transfer valuable assets during the time after indictment
but prior to conviction, while the criminal forfeiture provision
offers few such advantages. 62
An added benefit existed for prosecutors until the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Republic National Bank v. United
States.63 In light of the in rem nature of civil forfeiture jurisdic-
tion, some lower courts held that the government could divest
them of jurisdiction to hear appeals from forfeiture decisions by
selling or transferring the res, or asset.64 Justice Blackmun,
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through
the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party
against whom the order is to be entered.
21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988).
The property owner must receive notice and the opportunity for a hearing
prior to seizure. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B). Except in cases in which the govern-
ment files an indictment or information, a restraining order shall only be effec-
tive for 90 days unless the government seeks an extension by showing good
cause. Id. Alternatively, a temporary restraining order may be obtained in
cases in which "provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the prop-
erty for forfeiture," but these orders are valid for only ten days. 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e)(2). A showing of good cause may extend a temporary restraining order,
as may consent of the party against whom it is entered. Under this provision,
the court must hold a hearing at the "earliest possible time and prior to the
expiration of the temporary order." Id. In contrast, the civil forfeiture process
allows the government to seize property prior to conviction and without the ne-
cessity of obtaining a conviction. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
Thus, persons suspected of crimes do not have the time to find ways to remove
the assets from the government's reach.
62. The only advantage of criminal forfeiture is that it gives the court juris-
diction over all properties, not just those located within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the court. Jurisdiction in criminal cases is predicated on the location of
the offense. See FED. R. CRMI. P. 18. Courts hearing civil forfeiture actions may
only exercise jurisdiction over assets located or brought within their territorial
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1395(b), (c). But see 21 U.S.C. § 881(j) (1988) (au-
thorizing additional civil forfeiture venue in the district where the defendant is
found or where the criminal prosecution is brought if the defendant is the
owner of the subject property).
63. 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992).
64. In addition to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case, United States
v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 932 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Republic
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, see United States v. Tie's Cocktail
Lounge, 873 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1989). Other Circuit Courts have rejected this
jurisdictional rule. United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1992);
United States v. $1,322,242.58, 938 F.2d 433 (3rd Cir. 1991); United States v.
$29,959.00 U.S. Currency, 931 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
$95,945.18, U.S. Currency, 913 F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Karen L.
Fisher, Federal Court Jurisdiction in Civil Forfeitures of Personal Property Pur-
suant to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 26 IND. L.
REv. 657 (1993) (advocating a modern rule of jurisdiction for civil forfeiture
appeals).
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writing for the majority, abolished this jurisdictional rule in the
strongest terms: "The rule's illusory nature obviates the need
for such inquiries [into its usefulness], however, and a lack of
justification undermines any argument for its creation."65
The procedural advantages of civil forfeiture have enabled
the Justice Department to pursue two objectives besides punish-
ment of drug offenders, both of which have garnered wide sup-
port from law enforcement agencies. The Justice Department
lists as secondary and tertiary concerns the encouragement of
multi-jurisdictional cooperation among law enforcement and the
creation of new revenues for law enforcement.66 For purposes of
this analysis, it is not necessary to question the validity of these
objectives because the proposed changes in the forfeiture pro-
gram should not affect the ability of law enforcement to pursue
them.67
The success of the drug war, the federal government main-
tains, depends in large part on the ability of federal law enforce-
ment, principally the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
to attract the cooperation of all levels of law enforcement.68
Non-federal law enforcement agencies provide a large pool of ad-
ditional personnel with street-level intelligence about drug ac-
tivity,69 a highly valuable resource to the federal effort. Thus,
since the advent of the anti-drug crusade, the federal govern-
ment has endeavored to entice state and local agencies to enter
into joint operations.70 The two main programs for interagency
cooperation in law enforcement are the DEA State and Local
65. Republic Nat'l Bank, 113 S. Ct. at 559.
66. 1991 ANN. REP. supra note 9, at 1. Professors Zirning and Hawkins
provide an insightful policy analysis of the multi-jurisdictional nature of drug
law enforcement in their recent book. FRANELIN E. ZimING & GORDON HAW-
KiNs, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 158-176 (1992). The authors
cite countervailing advantages and disadvantages from the heightened involve-
ment of the federal government in drug policing. Id. at 162-64.
67. See infra Part IV.
68. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 1.
69. See JAN CHAIKEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: REDUCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 48
(1990).
70. Although federal agency cooperation with state and local police has ex-
isted in some form since the mid-1960s, the interaction took on new dimensions
in the mid-1980s. Id. at 45-47. The drug control strategy transformed the fed-
eral-state-local relationship from one that is largely informal and ad hoc to one
that is formal and ongoing. Id. at 45.
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Task Forces (DEA-SL Task Forces) 71 and the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs).7 2
The promotion of multi-jurisdictional cooperation was effec-
tively put into motion by the enactment of a 1984 provision that
allows the direct transfer of seized assets from drug dealers to
the law enforcement agencies that seized the assets, rather than
transferring them to the general fund of the United States
Treasury as previous forfeiture statutes required.7 3 For the first
time in our history, Congress created a profit incentive for law
71. The DEA-SL Task Forces date back to 1973 and were created on the
heels of a 1972 White House announcement of an anti-drug crusade. Id. at 44.
Asset forfeiture benefits, however, did not commence until the 1980s. Id. From
1991 to 1992, the number of DEA-SL Task Forces grew to 86 from 71, and now
exist in 40 states. OFFICE OF NATL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESiDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 118 (1992). The Admin-
istration planned to request a budget of $61.9 million for the DEA-SL Task
Forces in fiscal year 1993. Id.
72. See id. at 86. In 1982, President Reagan announced a new federal drug
control initiative, and Congress appropriated funds to create the Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program. OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y
GEN., REPORT ON THE ORGANIZED CRamIE DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE PRO-
GRAM 2 (1989-1990). The federal agencies involved included the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Federal
Bureau of Investigations; the Internal Revenue Service; the U.S. Attorneys' Of-
fices; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Marshall's Ser-
vice; and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. The heads of these
agencies along with senior officials of the Departments of Justice and Treasury
form the Executive Review Board of the program. Id. The task forces were
comprised of federal, state, and local agencies, and are coordinated by the U.S.
Attorneys' offices in 13 "core" cities. OFFICE OF NATL DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
supra note 71, at 86. The OCDETF program targets high-level drug traffickers,
including large-scale money laundering organizations, by achieving collabora-
tion between law enforcement at all levels. Id. at 85-86.
In addition, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 authorized the designation of
certain areas as "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas" (HIDTAs). Id. at 131.
The areas identified as HIDTAs are New York, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles
and the southwest border. Id. The designation entitles the regions to addi-
tional federal money that funds federal, state, and local law enforcement initia-
tives. Id. Of the $86 million budget for fiscal year 1992, $36 million was
distributed to state and local governments operating programs in the desig-
nated HIDTAs. Id. at 134.
73. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the Depart-
ment of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund to collect the proceeds of forfeited as-
sets, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 310, 98 Stat. 1837, 2052 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 524(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Congress amended § 881(e)(1)(A) to pro-
vide for this transferred property to go directly to law enforcement:
Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this sub-
chapter the Attorney General may-
(A) retain the property for official use or... transfer the property to
any Federal agency or to any State or local law enforcement agency
which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the
property....
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enforcement. Since the 1980s, participation in asset forfeiture
has enabled states and localities to collect assets from drug deal-
ers through the "equitable sharing" component of the federal as-
set forfeiture program.74 Given their financially-strapped
budgets,75 the incentive to pursue forfeitures must have been
even stronger for state and local agencies than for federal law
enforcement.76 In fact, the financial incentives became so com-
pelling that the asset forfeiture process came to be used in some
cases to punish drug dealers to the exclusion of the criminal jus-
tice system.7 7 In exchange for the work of non-federal police of-
ficers, the federal government has transferred forfeited assets
valued at over one billion dollars to state and local governments
since 1986,78 most of it in the last two years. 79
Congress's enthusiasm for asset forfeiture seems to reflect
the desire to create new sources of revenue for law enforcement
without increasing taxes.80 In 1991 alone, federal asset forfeit-
ures netted over two billion dollars.8 1 As a political matter, for-
feitures please everyone-law enforcement agencies, legislators,
21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988). Previously the statute required transfer to "the
general fund of the United States Treasury." Id. app. § 881.
74. Participants in joint task forces share most federal forfeiture funds.
See generally supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing task forces).
Equitable sharing gives each participating agency the opportunity to receive an
equitable share of forfeited assets based on its level of participation in the in-
vestigation yielding the forfeited assets. In 1991, the DEA recommended the
sharing of over $230 million dollars with state and local law enforcement agen-
cies. See 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 26. The United States government
also shares with foreign countries the proceeds of forfeited assets in exchange
for international cooperation pursuant to 1986 and 1988 amendments to the
forfeiture laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(E)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 46.
75. State budgets have suffered enormous strain from the effects of reces-
sion and rising health care costs. The cost of corrections has also risen sharply,
while voters have shown increasing reluctance to accept higher taxes to pay for
institutions like prisons. See Michael de Courcy Hinds, Study Sees Pain Ahead
in States' Budgets, N.Y. Tms, July 27, 1993, at A6.
76. See Nelson, supra note 9, at 1325-33.
77. Id.
78. 1992 ATrrY GEN. ANN. REP. 44-46.
79. See OFFICE OF NAVL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 71, at 86; 1992
AT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 26-27. In addition, the DEA assumes the costs of investi-
gative overtime for non-federal personnel, which could reach hundreds of
thousands of dollars annually. CHAIKEN ET AL., supra note 69, at 45.
80. 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 2. The Justice Department gave reve-
nue raising as a third reason for the program, see supra text accompanying note
66, but one author suggests this rationale has no basis in the legislative history
of asset forfeiture. See Reed, supra note 29, at 15.
81. Labaton, supra note 49, at Al.
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and the public. Indeed, the drive to raise revenues may have
superseded the other stated goals of asset forfeiture.8 2
Interagency cooperation and creating new sources of reve-
nue to fund drug law enforcement, no matter how highly valued,
should nonetheless be secondary to fundamental fairness in in-
dividual cases. In fact, these interests should not conflict. En-
couraging multi-jurisdictional cooperation by providing financial
incentives can be accomplished through the equitable sharing
program for assets forfeited through the criminal process in ad-
dition to a scaled down civil forfeiture program.83
III. THE APPARENT REFORMATION OF CIVIL DRUG
ASSET FORFEITURES
The parallel system for punishing drug offenders resulted in
such extreme punishment, upon some relatively minor partici-
pants, and, until recently, even upon some completely innocent
people, that both Congress and the Supreme Court have appar-
ently begun to take a harder look at the concept of punishment
by civil forfeiture. In the rush to punish drug offenders as se-
verely as possible and fill law enforcement coffers without tap-
ping government revenues, Congress overlooked two basic
penological principles that normally guide and limit the use of
state power against individuals: mens rea and proportionality
in sentencing.
The overall effect of the Court's decisions and Congress's re-
forms is to reshape the civil forfeiture process so that, standing
alone, it more justly metes out punishment for drug offenses. In
particular, the Austin case draws a sharp distinction between
remedial and punitive forfeitures, suggesting that punitive for-
feitures will be treated as criminal sentences. As discussed in-
fra, however, the new restrictions on the government's power to
punish drug offenders through the civil forfeiture system fall
82. One commentator points to several internal memoranda circulated by
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and acting Deputy Attorney General Ed-
ward S.G. Dennis, Jr. in which they strongly urged federal prosecutors to make
every effort to increase forfeiture revenues in order to meet budget projections.
Id. at A10. Michael Zeldin, a former Justice Department official responsible for
the asset forfeiture office, recently affirmed that, "the desire to deposit money
into the asset forfeiture fund became the reason for being of forfeiture, eclipsing
in certain measure the desire to effect fair enforcement of the laws as a matter
of pure law enforcement objectives." Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 9, at 1325-
33 (discussing law enforcement goals in pursuing asset forfeiture).
83. See infra Part IV (advocating factoring forfeiture into sentencing).
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short of ensuring fair treatment of drug offenders.8 4 As long as
civil forfeiture can be used in addition to criminal punishment,
reformation of civil forfeiture will not eliminate the possibility of
excessive punishment of offenders.
A. INCORPORATING A MENS REA REQUIREMENT: THE INNOCENT
OWNER DEFENSE
The mental element of criminal conduct, or "mens rea," long
considered the bedrock justification for criminal punishment,8 5
had no place in forfeiture jurisprudence until late in our history.
In 1974, the Supreme Court held that a legislature could author-
ize the forfeiture of illegally-used property even if the owner of
the property was not the wrongdoer and had no knowledge of
the wrongdoing.8 6 The fiction that the forfeiture action pro-
ceeded against the "guilty" property rendered the owner's inter-
ests virtually irrelevant.8 7
The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the forfeiture of
a leasing company's property when the company's only wrongdo-
ing had been to lease a yacht. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co.,88 the government of Puerto Rico seized a pleasure
yacht that Pearson Yacht Leasing leased to two Puerto Rican
residents who possessed one marijuana cigarette.8 9 Pearson
Yacht argued that the forfeiture amounted to a government tak-
ing without just compensation because it was an innocent
owner.90 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, relied on a
historically-based rationale in concluding that the forfeiture of
property from the leasing company did not violate the Fifth
Amendment.91 The earlier decisions on which Pearson Yacht
84. See infra part IV.
85. For a discussion of the importance of mens rea in criminal law com-
pared to its relative insignificance in civil law, see Mann, supra note 28, at
1805-06.
86. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 664-65, 679-
80 (1974).
87. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing the fiction of
"guilty" property).
88. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
89. Id. at 665, 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
90. The Fifth Amendment prohibits "private property [to] be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
91. Id. at 670-90. The Court relied on the line of cases upholding the con-
stitutionality of civil forfeitures used to punish for criminal activity, without
reconsidering the validity of those prior decisions. Early cases upheld the for-
feiture of properties and conveyances notwithstanding the innocence of the
owners. See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
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rested indicate that the reason for punishing owners without re-
gard to their actual knowledge of wrongdoing rested on notions
of negligence.9 2 In effect, the law imposed a burden on property
owners to take every possible precaution to prevent illegal use of
the property.
The Court did allow a defense for truly innocent owners
whose situations "give rise to serious constitutional ques-
tions."93 The Court distinguished between owners who had no
knowledge of the wrongdoing but exercised control in entrusting
the property to others, and property owners who had no such
control. The Court identified two types of truly innocent owners:
those whose property had been taken "without his privity or con-
sent,"94 and those who "had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use."9 5
Interestingly, the Pearson Yacht case relied on the 1921
Goldsmith-Grant case in which the Supreme Court found it un-
necessary to address the contention that the law might allow "an
ocean steamer [to] be condemned to confiscation if a package of
... liquor be innocently received and transported by it," reason-
ing that law "ha[d] not yet received such amplitude of applica-
tion."96 Yet, in Pearson Yacht, the Court upheld this very
result-forfeiture of a yacht from an innocent owner because a
lessee transported a small amount of contraband-without even
acknowledging that the law had arrived at such "amplitude of
application."97 Although conveyances had long been subject to
forfeiture without regard to the culpability of the owners,98 the
inherent unfairness of forfeiture in cases in which the property
owner could prove innocence attracted little public attention un-
til the government's "zero tolerance" campaign.9 9 This cam-
paign drew attention to the forfeitures of valuable yachts
because someone on board possessed a tiny amount of marl-
92. See Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511-12; Dobbin's Distillery, 96 U.S.
at 399.
93. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 689; see also Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801, 2808-2810 (1993) (relying on notion that owner was negligent in al-
lowing his property to be misused).
94. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 689.
95. Id.
96. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 512.
97. Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 685-90.
98. See Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 512.
99. Under the Justice Department's "zero tolerance" policy, the govern-
ment expressed unequivocally its intent to "seize any conveyance containing
illegal drugs, no matter how small the quantity of drugs or how valuable the
conveyance." See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 10, at 1272.
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juana. °00 When Congress expanded the forfeiture law in 1978 to
reach drug proceeds, it included an innocent owner defense.' 0 '
It included similar defenses in the provisions for real property in
1984,102 and conveyances in 1988.-03 This long overdue and
fundamental change in forfeiture law recognizes and adjusts for
its penal nature. The "innocent owner" defenses incorporate a
mens rea requirement; the government may not seize property
unless a person has knowingly committed or facilitated a viola-
tion of the criminal laws. 0 4
The Supreme Court's recent embrace of this defense in
United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,' 05 indicates an uneasiness
with the government's ability to deprive innocent people of their
property rights.'0 6 The decision severely restricts the govern-
ment's ability to go behind sham transactions in which owners
claim to be innocent but are in reality in business with the drug
offender. Given the perceived ideological leanings of many of
100. The media has reported a number of instances in which the govern-
ment seized yachts and other large vessels because they found a minute
amount of marijuana on board. The Los Angeles Times, for example, reported
that agents seized the premier ship of the U.S. oceanographic research fleet
after finding 1/100th of an ounce of marijuana in a crewman's shaving kit, and
confiscated the luxury yacht Monkey Business after discovering 1/28th of an
ounce of marijuana aboard. See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 10, at
1272, 1273 n.89 (citing Savage & Fritsch, U.S. Eases Rule on Drug Linked Ship
Seizures, L.A. TIMEs, May 21, 1988, § 2 at 1).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988), authorizes the forfeiture of all proceeds
traceable to a drug offense with the following exception: "no property shall be
forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."
102. The innocent owner defense in § 881(a)(7) real property forfeitures is
worded identically to the drug proceeds defense. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
(1984); see supra note 99 (discussing drug proceeds).
103. Section 881(a)(4)(c) reads: "no conveyance shall be forfeited under this
paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omis-
sion established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(c)
(1988).
104. For a discussion of lower court interpretations of the scienter require-
ments of the innocent owner defenses, see Loomba, supra note 10, at 478-91.
105. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
106. Numerous commentators have analyzed the shortcomings of the asset
forfeiture provisions in protecting the rights of innocent owners or other third
parties, such as joint tenants, tenants in common, lienholders or mortgagors,
and multiple owners. See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 10;
Jankowski, supra note 10; Loomba, supra note 10; Saltzburg, supra note 10.
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the members of the Court and the suspicious nature of the facts
involved, this case may well have been decided the other way.107
The property owner in 92 Buena Vista received $240,000
from a man with whom she had "maintained an intimate per-
sonal relationship" for six years.108 She purchased a home for
herself and her three children with the money. The government
established that there was probable cause to believe the funds
she used to buy the house were proceeds of illegal drug traffick-
ing.'0 9 Despite her close, long-term relationship with the al-
leged drug dealer, the property owner claimed to have no
knowledge of the illegal source of the money.110
The District Court ruled against the home owner on two
grounds. First, the court ruled that the protection for "owners"
applied only to bona fide purchasers for value.L"' The court ac-
cepted the government's contention that although § 881(a)(6)
makes no explicit reference to "bona fide purchasers for value,"
courts should nonetheless read the restriction into the definition
of the term.1 2 The government argued that any other reading
would make it easy for drug dealers to set up sham transfers by
means of gift. 1 3 Because the owner in this case received the
107. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned Right; Rea-
gan's Choices Tip the Balance, N.Y. TmIs, July 7, 1989, at Al (commenting
that "for the first time in a generation, a conservative majority was in a position
to control the outcome on most important issues"); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Shaping
the Court: Reagan is Not the First President Thwarted by Unpredictability of
Issues, and Minds, N.Y. Tntms, July 1, 1988, at Al (citing evidence that Chief
Justice Rehnquist and three Reagan appointees are moving the Court in a con-
servative direction, although not as conservative as Reagan may have wished);
Tom Wicker, In the Nation; This Radical Court, N.Y. Trbms, June 29, 1991, at
A23 (noting that conservative justices showed a lack of judicial restraint in
overturning constitutional precedents).
108. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1130.
109. Id.
110. Id. The forfeiture involved real property, yet the claim arises under
§ 881(a)(6) because the government contended that the property was purchased
with tainted proceeds. A claim arising under § 881(a)(7) would apply if the
property had been used to commit or facilitate the commission of a drug trans-
action. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) with § 881(a)(7).
111. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1130.
112. Id. at 1130 n.5. The government did not dispute the broader interpre-
tation of the term "owner," but argued the respondent was not an owner be-
cause of the operation of the relation-back doctrine. Id. at 1134; see also infra
notes 118-127 and accompanying text.
113. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1137; see also Text of the New 'Relation
Back Doctrine', 2 DOJ ALERT, Aug. 1992, at 9 (reprinting the text of a memo
outlining the Department of Justice's policy on the innocent owner defense and
the relation back doctrine written by Cary Copeland, the Director and Chief
Counsel of the Office for Asset Forfeiture).
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proceeds used to purchase the home as a gift, she was not con-
sidered a bona fide purchaser for value.11 4
The Supreme Court handily disposed of this point by af-
firming the Third Circuit's decision to reject the limitation to
bona fide purchasers forvalue. The Court could not find support
for this reading in the text of the statute which says nothing
about bona fide purchasers for value.'1 5 Indeed, the Third Cir-
cuit found evidence of legislative intent not to limit innocent
owner protection in the fact that the criminal forfeiture statute
contains this restriction," 6 while Congress omitted similar lan-
guage in § 881.137
A second issue arose from the conflict between two provi-
sions in § 881: the innocent owner defense and the "relation
back" or "taint" doctrine. 118 The relation back doctrine is codi-
fied at § 881(h): "All right, title, and interest in property de-
scribed in subsection (a) shall vest in the United States upon
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this sec-
tion." 1 9 Under this doctrine, title to property passes to the gov-
ernment at the time of the illegal act.120 Because the owner
purchased the property at a point in time after the illegal acts-
the purchase proceeds were derived from drug trade-the gov-
ernment had constructively taken ownership of the proceeds
114. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1130.
115. Id. at 1134.
116. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
117. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1131 n.8. The government favored the
rule in the criminal forfeiture provision, § 853(c), that gives protection only to
bona fide purchasers for value and disallows the operation of the relation back
doctrine to this group. See Text of the New 'Relation Back Doctrine', supra note
113. Such a rule gives full protection to the type of owners that are truly inno-
cent and would not have notice that the assets might be forfeitable. Id. Be-
cause Congress did not write § 881 in this way, the government found itself in
the position of arguing that the doctrine bars an innocent owner defense for
anyone who obtains proceeds after an illegal transaction. 92 Buena Vista, 113
S. Ct. at 1135 n.18.
118. Id. at 1134-37; 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Note, Tempering the Relation Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to
Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REv. 165 (1990) (arguing that courts
should narrowly construe the relation back doctrine).
119. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988). The statutory rule did not go into effect until
two years after respondent had acquired the property in issue. Therefore, the
government had to rely on both the § 881(h) provision enacted in 1984 as an
amendment to the civil forfeiture statute, and on the common law rule. 92
Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35.
120. This common law doctrine is also codified in other criminal and civil
forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2253(b), 2254(g) (1988) (sexual ex-
ploitation of minors); 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (1988) (money laundering, FIRREA
violations).
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prior to their being used to purchase the house. Thus, title to
the house passed to the government at the time of the purchase
with the tainted money.121
The district court applied the relation back doctrine to
trump the respondent's innocent owner defense.' 22 The issue
was whether the court should read the relation back doctrine to
effectively nullify the innocent owner defense for owners of drug
proceeds.' 23 The Third Circuit and Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation.' 24 The Supreme Court reasoned that because
the assets in question are proceeds of a drug transaction, by defi-
nition they cannot come into an owner's possession until after
the illegal act.' 25 Thus, "the Government's submission would ef-
fectively eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every
imaginable case in which proceeds could be forfeited."126 The
Court refused to accept an interpretation of the relation back
provision that had the effect of rendering the innocent owner de-
fense meaningless.' 27 Congress scaled back the reach of civil
forfeitures by providing protection for innocent parties, and the
Supreme Court has given that protection the fullest coverage
possible.
B. INCORPORATING PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: THE EXCESSIVE
FiNEs CLAUSE OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Austin v. United States128 may become a landmark case be-
cause in it the Supreme Court developed a previously unex-
plored area of constitutional law. In a unanimous decision with
two concurring opinions, 12 9 the Court found that a valid issue
existed under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
121. 92 Buena Vista, 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35.
122. Id. at 1130.
123. Id. at 1134-37.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1135.
126. Id.
127. The Court said, "It seems unlikely that Congress would create a mean-
ingless defense." Id. The decision also rejected the government's argument
that the common law relation-back rule vested perfected title to property in the
government at the time of the illegal act without the requirement of a judicial
condemnation. The Court found that the common law rule required a judicial
determination for title to pass. Id. at 1135-37.
128. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
129. Justice Scalia wrote one concurring opinion; Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, wrote the second. Id. at 2812,
2815.
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Clause.' 30 Every other lower court that considered dispropor-
tionality claims in forfeiture cases assumed that if the Eighth
Amendment did apply, the cruel and unusual punishment test of
Solem v. Helm should control. 13  The few cases that mentioned
the Excessive Fines Clause merely recited it in the same breath
as the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause without formulat-
ing a different test than that under Solem.13 2 The Supreme
Court in Austin, on the other hand, clearly rested its decision
exclusively on the Excessive Fines Clause, making no reference
to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, nor explaining
whether or why different treatment is in order.133
130. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST., amend VIII. Remarka-
bly, the Court considered the Excessive Fines Clause only once before. Brown-
ing-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989)
(holding the Excessive Fines Clause does not limit punitive damages award to
private party). Browning-Ferris explicitly left open the question of whether the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applied only in criminal cases. Id.
at 263-64.
131. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983). See, e.g., United States v.
38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 55 (1992) (holding that forfeiture of home does not violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause).
Most courts held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem
forfeiture actions because the Amendment only applies in criminal cases.
These cases generally do not distinguish between particular clauses of the
Amendment. See generally United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814
(8th Cir. 1992) (this case became the Austin case); United States v. One Parcel
of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 206-207 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. On
Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Jaffe
v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 364 (1989).
With respect to criminal forfeitures, courts also applied Solem's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment test. See, e.g., United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716,
721-24 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Vriner, 921 F.2d 710, 712-13 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 772 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413-16 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. See, e.g., supra note 131 (citing 38 Whalers Cove Drive).
133. One interpretation of the Court's chosen path would ascribe to it result-
oriented considerations. If the Court believed that forfeitures should be sub-
jected to meaningful proportionality review, the cruel and unusual punishment
jurisprudence provided no support. With respect to sentences of imprisonment,
the Court's most recent decision interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), held that the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause contains only lim-
ited protection against disproportionate punishment. Id. at 2701-02. The
Harmelin decision upheld a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of
parole for a first-time offender who had possessed 672 grams of cocaine. Id. at
2716 (White, J., dissenting). No other state had imposed such a harsh
mandatory sentence for a drug offense of this severity level. Id. at 2718-19.
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In Austin, the defendant challenged the forfeiture of his
properties as a punishment disproportionate to the severity of
his offense, arguing that the Excessive Fines Clause should ap-
ply. 13 4 The government argued that the Eighth Amendment ap-
plies only in criminal cases and that civil asset forfeitures
should not be characterized as criminal. 13 5 The Court rejected
the government's Eighth Amendment interpretation. 13 6
The question of whether courts should reclassify civil for-
feitures as criminal in light of their punitive nature has been the
The Court refused to extend the requirement in capital cases that courts
must consider mitigating circumstances to cases involving mandatory life
sentences without possibility of parole, maintaining the bright-line distinction
between death sentences and all other types of punishment. Id. at 2701-02.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia found no proportionality guarantee
at all. Id. at 2686.
Even prior to Harmelin, lower courts applying the Solem test have shown a
disinclination to find gross disproportionality in forfeiture cases, even in cases
that would strike most observers as extreme. See, e.g., United States v. 38
Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding forfeiture of de-
fendant's interest in residence that was "close to three hundred times the total
value of cocaine sold inside it").
134. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993).
135. Id. at 2804. The government argued that the Eighth Amendment
should only apply if the Court reclassified civil asset forfeitures as criminal
under the test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963),
and United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804. In
Ward, the Court fashioned a two-part test for distinguishing civil and criminal
statutes. The first step is to determine whether Congress intended the statute
to be criminal or civil. If Congress labeled the statute civil, the second step is to
inquire "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or ef-
fect as to negate that intention." Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49. The Mendoza-Mar-
tinez decision lists seven factors that courts should consider in making the civil-
criminal determination:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry ....
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
Applying these tests, the Court previously determined that another civil
forfeiture statute was indeed a "civil" provision. See, e.g., United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984). For a thorough discussion
of the application of the Ward test and the Mendoza-Martinez factors to § 881
forfeitures, see Stahl, supra note 9, at 306-37.
136. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
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focus of much discussion. 137 If courts deem civil forfeitures
criminal, they would need to provide all the constitutional pro-
tections available to criminal defendants to property owners in
civil forfeiture cases as well. It is argued that the task of pun-
ishing criminals, particularly the most serious offenders, is the
essential role of the criminal justice system. In the simplest
terms, however, the unique function of the civil legal system is
to provide a remedy to private parties who have suffered a harm.
Under the current structure, civil drug asset forfeitures lie in
the "middleground" between civil and criminal law, and courts
mete out criminal punishment within the construct of a civil
action.138
137. For arguments that civil asset forfeitures under § 881 should be consid-
ered criminal proceedings, see Stahl, supra note 9, at 301-37; Schecter, supra
note 10, at 1157-64; Yoskowitz, supra note 10, at 582-92.
138. A number of authors have explored the general theoretical distinction
between the civil and criminal systems. Most recently, Professor Kenneth
Mann explored the use of "punitive civil sanctions," in other words, the use of
civil law to inflict punishment, a purpose normally associated with criminal
law. See Mann, supra note 28, at 1738. Professor Mann refers to a large body
of laws that depart from the paradigmatic criminal and civil law models of law
to form what he calls a "middleground." Id. at 1796-99. He advocates the devel-
opment of this middleground as an efficient means of handling less serious
criminal offenses. Id. at 1861-62.
Professor Mann includes forfeiture statutes in his discussion of mid-
dleground legislation. Id. at 1797-98 (citing property forfeited under the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act of 1988, penalties sought under the False Claims Act,
and punitive damages awarded under common law tort principles as examples
of punitive civil penalties). Forfeiture provisions, however, do not have the
same attributes as the other punitive civil sanctions he addresses.
Of singular importance, at least until Austin, forfeiture statutes did not
inflict punishment against individuals to a level that any legal body-be it a
judge, jury, legislature, or administrative agency-had determined to be com-
mensurate with the legal infraction. As a consequence of the in rem nature of
the action, the forfeiture was not structured as a penalty against an individual
that varied according to the seriousness of the offense. Property owners could
lose property, no matter how valuable, upon a finding of a drug violation, no
matter how insignificant. Any violation "taints" any property. See supra notes
47-48 and accompanying text.
In contrast, other "middleground" jurisprudence indicates that courts may
impose multiple damages or money penalties to the extent necessary to inflict
sufficient punishment. See Mann, supra note 28, at 1814-15 (discussing the
principle of "more-than-compensatory monetary sanctions"). Professor Zimring
argues that civil forfeiture statutes are intended to "add more punishment and
deterrence to that imposed in the criminal process and give law enforcers a
second chance at punishment if the criminal prosecution misses its mark."
Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901, 1905 (1992). He is probably correct in concluding that
"[a]ny diversion from criminal prosecution would disappoint" the supporters of
forfeiture statutes. Id.; see also Stahl, supra note 9, at 335 (noting survey that
found parallel criminal charges filed in only 20% percent of § 881 cases).
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The Court declined to reconsider the "civil" label attached to
civil asset forfeitures, finding such reconsideration unnecessary
because the Eighth Amendment contains no limitation restrict-
ing its application to criminal cases.13 9 The Court instead
stated that the decisive issue was whether civil forfeitures con-
stitute "punishment" or whether they are "remedial" meas-
ures.' 40 The government argued that civil forfeitures are
primarily "remedial" in nature in that they serve to "remove the
'instruments' of the drug trade" and to "compensate the Govern-
ment for the expense of law enforcement activity and for its ex-
penditure on societal problems such as urban blight, drug
addiction, and other health concerns resulting from the drug
trade."' 4 '
The Court flatly rejected these arguments and articulated a
new approach to the remedial-punitive dichotomy. The Austin
approach examines the type of asset seized to determine
whether it is properly characterized as contraband or an instru-
mentality. 142 The Court previously rejected the characteriza-
For two critiques of Professor Mann's proposal to use punitive civil sanc-
tions to scale back the range of criminal law cases, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Para-
digms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What
Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992); Zimring, supra; see also Mary
M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Dis-
tinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (arguing that criminal-civil law distinc-
tion leads to inadequate protection of constitutional rights).
139. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-06. This interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is not inconsistent with the Court's earlier decision in Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), which found the Eighth Amendment only applica-
ble "to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of gov-
ernment." Id. at 664. In Ingraham, the Court held the Eighth Amendment
inapplicable to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools. Id.; see also
Irene M. Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy,
78 COL. L. REv. 75 (1978) (finding the Court's Eighth Amendment holding
based upon "ambiguous history and dubious precedent"). The application of the
Eighth Amendment to civil drug asset forfeitures, but not to public school disci-
plinary methods, makes sense because the former, not the latter, is premised on
criminal conduct and prosecuted by government prosecutors.
140. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805-06.
141. Id. at 2811. This argument seems inconsistent with the Justice De-
partment's stated primary objective in pursuing drug asset forfeitures: "to pun-
ish and deter criminal activity." 1991 ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 1. The Court
noted in Austin that the governments argument also omitted reference to the
legislative history of the civil forfeiture statute in which Congress recognized
the penal nature of civil forfeiture, although it quoted the same passage with
approval in its brief in the earlier case that term, United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), cited in Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 n.13.
142. The Austin approach appears to differ from that of United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). The two situations, however, are also different. In
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tion of a conveyance as a remedial forfeiture of "contraband" in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, reasoning that,
"[t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an auto-
mobile."143 In Austin, the Court similarly refused to character-
ize the defendant's home and auto body shop as
"instruments."144 In other words, it found that real properties
that "facilitate" drug offenses by serving as the location of a
transaction are not "instrumentalities"; their forfeiture is pun-
ishment plain and simple.145
The Austin Court rejected the theory that the civil forfeit-
ures at issue are remedial because the forfeiture of property
under § 881 bears no relation to the costs of enforcing the law in
each case. 146 To the extent the lower courts attempt to factor in
the enforcement costs, the Court dismissed the government's
theory of general compensation for costs associated with drug
crimes such as "urban blight" and "drug addiction."147 Indeed,
the Court rejected any claims by the government for remedial
compensation by means of real property and conveyance
forfeitures.148
Halper, the statute created a fixed fine structure intended to serve a purely
remedial purpose. Its application to an offender who committed many small
violations, however, resulted in a fine far exceeding the governments costs and
damages, qualifying it as "punishment." Id. at 449. The Court found that the
defendant was entitled to an accounting from the government. Id. at 449-50.
The majority held that any fine beyond that which is necessary to make the
government whole would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id.; see also infra part IV.B.1 (discussing double jeopardy in civil
forfeiture cases).
The pivotal distinction between Halper and Austin is that in Austin, the
Court found the forfeitures to serve primarily a punitive purpose. The majority
stated that the "dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real prop-
erty forfeitable under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) undercut" any argument that these
constitute a form of liquidated damages. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811-12. Thus,
the fact that they may also serve "some remedial purpose" became irrelevant.
Id. at 2812. The Court relied on the following language in Halper: "[A] civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is
punishment, as we have come to understand the term." Id. (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). Thus, the Court made no allowance for an accounting by
the government of its costs and damages. Id.
143. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn-
sylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
144. Id. at 2811.
145. As such, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against excessive fines required courts to limit the value of the assets forfeited
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Because civil forfeitures of real property and conveyances
should be viewed as "payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense,"149 the Court held that these are "subject to the
limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause."150 The Court remanded this case, and a second case
decided that day,' 51 to the lower courts to consider exactly what
limits the Constitution places on the government's power to pun-
ish criminal offenders by means of financial penalties, in cash or
in kind. 152
The long overdue recognition that the government's use of
punitive civil forfeiture should be limited in proportion to the
severity of the offense, however, does not rationalize the punish-
ment of drug offenders in the federal system. The Austin case
does nothing that explicitly factors forfeiture punishment into
the sentencing decision-making process; Austin only requires
that punishment imposed by means of civil forfeiture be limited
in accordance with the Excessive Fines Clause.
IV. FACTORING FORFEITURES INTO THE
SENTENCING CALCULUS
Federal drug laws authorize the government to file civil ac-
tions to seize property while also filing criminal charges. At sen-
tencing for criminal drug offenses, courts need not formally
factor any civil forfeitures into the decision-making process.
Consequently, criminal sentences for drug offenders that do not
take into account civil forfeitures are per se too harsh and may
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.153 The following sections
149. Id. at 2812 (citing Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
150. Id.
151. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
152. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin suggests an excessiveness test
that would undercut the desire to achieve proportionality. His position is that
civil forfeitures should be treated differently from monetary fines or criminal
forfeitures, relying on the time-worn fiction that the property is the guilty
party. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring). Rather than con-
sider the value of the property, Justice Scalia stated that, "[tihe relevant in-
quiry for an excessive forfeiture under § 881 is the relationship of the property
to the offense: Was it close enough to render the property, under traditional
standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable?" Id. at 2815.
The majority responded to Justice Scalia's proposal in a footnote: "We do
not rule out the possibility that the connection between the property and the
offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way limits the Court of
Appeals from considering other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of
Austin's property was excessive." Id. at 2812 n.15.
153. See infra notes 182-196 (discussing double jeopardy concerns).
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propose reforms that would begin to harmonize fairness con-
cerns with the government's interest in pursuing an aggressive
campaign against drug offenders.
A. LIMITING CML FoRFEITURES TO CASES OF NECESSITY
In general, a rule of necessity should define the scope of civil
asset forfeitures. Ideally, Congress should limit civil forfeitures
to the cases in which an expedient civil forfeiture process is nec-
essary: remedial forfeitures and those in which the government
cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction over the suspected drug
offender. These limitations preserve the important interests of
law enforcement in reaching illegitimate assets that would
otherwise be beyond their reach and assuring fairness to the
wrongdoer. In contrast, punitive forfeitures should be left to
criminal courts in the exercise of their sentencing authority. As
less satisfactory alternatives, the Sentencing Commission could
amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines fine provisions to fac-
tor punitive civil forfeitures into their sentencing decisions,' 54
or, if that change is not made, individual sentencing courts
should make it a practice to consider the value of punitive civil
forfeitures when deciding on the appropriate criminal forfeiture
or fine and prison sentence. 155
1. Distinguishing Remedial and Punitive Forfeitures
The Austin decision identifies two types of punitive civil for-
feitures: forfeitures of conveyances and forfeitures of real
properties that facilitate drug offenses. 156 As such, these assets
should be forfeitable only as part of a criminal sentence. 57 This
154. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines include a requirement that courts
consider the consequences of civil actions in sentencing organizations. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at § 8C2.8(a)(3).
155. Federal courts have the authority to depart from the sentence range
specified by the Guidelines if they find that, "an aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see also
U.S.S.G., supra note 26, at 5-6 (discussing the sentencing ranges specified by
the Guidelines).
156. 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
157. It is worth mention that the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
civil forfeiture of conveyances and real properties served to compensate the gov-
ernment for the costs of law enforcement. To be considered remedial, a civil
forfeiture must serve a purely remedial purpose. As Congress designed these
forfeitures in part as punitive measures, they could not be characterized as re-
medial. Austin, 113 S. Ct., at 2811-12; see also supra note 141 (discussing this
aspect of the Austin decision). Thus, the government may no longer rely on this
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change would require Congress to abolish §§ 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7). These properties would instead be forfeited through the
criminal forfeiture provision found in 21 U.S.C. § 853. This pro-
vision already allows for the forfeiture of any property that facil-
itates a drug offense upon conviction for the offense. In order to
prevent the transfer or hiding of these assets, Congress should
amend the seizure provisions of § 853 to give prosecutors greater
leeway to take possession of properties prior to conviction. 158
In contrast, the civil procedure for the forfeiture of contra-
band, the instrumentalities of drug manufacturing and distribu-
tion, serves a purely remedial purpose and should be
maintained. 15 9 It is beyond peradventure that law enforcement
should not be hindered in its removal of drugs or other illegal
substances and equipment. Officers should not have to wait un-
til after a conviction to seize cocaine found in a car or the equip-
ment used to make LSD found in a factory.
As a matter of necessity as well as principle, civil forfeitures
of traceable proceeds should also be permitted.160 Drug profits
do not legitimately belong to the person who possesses them.
Their forfeiture is purely remedial, has no sentencing implica-
tions, and thus does not raise Eighth Amendment concerns. 16 '
Moreover, the forfeiture of proceeds would often elude law en-
forcement if the civil process is not available. In many airport
cases, for example, federal law enforcement officers will discover
a passenger carrying a large sum of cash who they believe is
involved in the drug trade.162 The cash will often be subjected to
theory in seizing these types of properties. See, e.g., United States v. 835 Sev-
enth Street, 832 F. Supp. 43, 48-49 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an unconsti-
tutionally excessive civil forfeiture may not be saved by selling the subject
premises and then remitting only a portion of the proceeds to the government).
158. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text (discussing the shortfalls
of § 853).
159. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(1)-(3) (controlled substances, raw materials,
equipment and containers); (a)(5) (books and records); (a)(8)-(9) (controlled sub-
stances and listed chemicals). 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
160. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
161. See supra notes 128-152 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth
Amendement).
162. The DEA has developed "drug courier profiles" for use in interdiction
efforts in airports and train stations. If a passenger fits a particular profile,
officers will stop the person to ask about the person's itinerary, to see identifica-
tion, and to ask for consent to search the person's belongings and sometimes the
person's body. In addition to profiles, officers rely on information provided by
airlines or railway companies such as whether a passenger purchases tickets
with cash or whether the person is travelling from a "source city." See, e.g.,
Sandra Guerra, Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations: Finding the Balance,
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a drug-detecting dog sniff, and in many cases the dog will react
positively to traces of some narcotic substance. 63
The officers can establish probable cause that the money
was derived from drug transactions to meet the burden of proof
for civil forfeiture.164 .The totality of the circumstances often
gives a court sufficient reason to believe that the cash was not
legitimately earned.' 65 In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the trav-
eler would be given the opportunity to establish the legitimate
source of the money if one exists. For one who holds the money
legitimately-perhaps by inheritance, by earning it through a
legitimate profession, or by winning a lottery-evidence to prove
the money's source should be easy to obtain and, if shown, would
surely be conclusive. Thus, the interests of innocent owners are
sufficiently protected in the civil forfeiture context.
If the officers are required to proceed through the criminal
process, forfeiting the money only after conviction, their efforts
will be frustrated in airport drug proceeds cases. The officers
cannot charge the individual with a crime even if they have rea-
son to believe the person is involved in the drug trade. Posses-
sion of the cash is not a crime per se, nor will the officers be able
to establish that a particular drug transaction took place or who
was involved.
When drug proceeds are used to purchase assets such as
real property or conveyances, the forfeiture of those assets
presents different considerations than the forfeiture of the pro-
ceeds themselves, but in the final analysis, these assets should
also be civilly forfeitable. The seizure of homes, however, can
cause extreme hardship by depriving owners of essential assets.
The fact that the process can produce such hardship creates a
need for safeguards against erroneous seizure to protect inno-
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1118-21 (1992) (describing DEA drug cou-
rier profile operations).
163. For a discussion of the use of narcotics detection dogs, see id. at 1150-
55.
164. See United States v. $37,780 in United States Currency, 920 F.2d 159,
164 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding falsity of traveler's statements and evidence of ex-
tensive involvement in drugs established probable cause to believe forfeiture
action could be maintained); United States v. $91,960.00, 897 F.2d 1457, 1462
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding a "large sum of money, unexplained and in conjunction
with the presence of drug paraphernalia, may constitute evidence of probable
cause"); United States v. $38,600.00 in U.S. Currency, 784 F.2d 694, 698 (5th
Cir. 1986 (same); cf United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (holding
DEA agents had "reasonable suspicion" to stop an airport passenger who had
large sum of money and behaved in other suspicious ways).
165. In determining whether law enforcement had probable cause, courts
must make a situation-specific inquiry. See, e.g., supra note 164 (citing cases).
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cent occupants from sudden dislocation. Because real estate is
the type of asset that cannot easily be removed or transferred, it
should be possible to fashion procedural rules to minimize the
potential for undue hardship for innocent parties, without frus-
trating government efforts.
2. Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction
The procedure for seizing and forfeiting the assets of
criminals emerged out of the need166 to permit the government
to enforce civil judgments and exact criminal penalties against
individuals 167 outside the jurisdictional reach of American
courts.' 68 This concern continues to the present day and civil
forfeiture law should reflect it.
166. As noted by the Supreme Court in 1844, forfeiture of property under
admiralty law "is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate
means of suppressing the [offense] or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the
injured party." United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233
(1844).
167. Private parties who were victims of criminal acts of piracy invoked the
in rem forfeiture actions developed in admiralty law to obtain restitution. See,
e.g., Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233 (holding private parties who were
victimized could claim property that the government acquired); The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1827) (in rem proceeding against ship involved in
piracy).
168. According to principles of international law and considerations of Fifth
Amendment Due Process, a federal court may not hear a criminal action unless
the person charged with the crime stands before the court when the trial be-
gins. U.S. CONST. amend. V; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 422(2) (1986) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT). This be-
comes particularly troublesome when the court is attempting to bring foreign or
fugitive drug defendants to trial. A grand jury can indict a non-present defend-
ant, but an arrest warrant can only be served within the United States or by a
request for extradition to the asylum country in the case of a defendant found
abroad. Id. § 422 cmt. c(iii).
Although extradition exists as an option in theory, it is not a convenient
procedure in practice. Extradition from an asylum country requires two condi-
tions to be met. First, the United States must have "jurisdiction to prescribe,"
defined as the authority of a state to make substantive laws applicable to par-
ticular people and circumstances. See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators
of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 191, 201 n.39 (1983). The government may obtain jurisdiction to pre-
scribe by establishing that any of five types of jurisdiction apply: territorial
jurisdiction, national jurisdiction, protective jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction,
or passive personality or victim theory jurisdiction. See generally id. at 201-03
(describing general principles of jurisdiction under international law.) Most
cases arise under territorial jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction is established
if the individual committed the offense in the United States or if the defend-
ant's extraterritorial actions had an actual or intended effect in the United
States. See generally id. at 203-04 (describing territorial jurisdiction).
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The earliest forfeiture statutes allowed for the forfeiture of
foreign ships whose crews were alleged to have smuggled contra-
band into the United States or to have engaged in piracy.169 The
Palmyra case' 70 and United States v. Brig Malek Adhel'71 in-
volved forfeitures of ships whose crews engaged in piracy. In
both cases, the crews of foreign-owned vessels engaged in acts of
aggression against American ships.' 7 2 Lacking jurisdiction to
In addition, the government must satisfy a second requirement, 'jurisdic-
tion to enforce," defined as the power to induce or compel compliance with its
laws. RESTATEmENT, supra, § 401(c). A federal court can only act in the terri-
tory of another country with the consent of that country. Treaties establish
consent in advance, and commonly list five characteristics that must be met in
order to extradite: there must be cause for holding the person for trial, the
offense must not be a "political offense", the offense must be within the jurisdic-
tion to prescribe by the requesting state, the offense must be considered a crime
in both the requesting and asylum state ("dual criminality"), and extradition
must not violate principles of double jeopardy. Id. at § 476. Finally, extradition
must also meet the concept of "specialty," meaning that a person can only be
tried for the crime for which he was extradited. Id. at § 477.
Consent can also be obtained on an ad hoc basis. One ad hoc approach is
known as "The International Comity of Nations." United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886). Under this doctrine, a state voluntarily surrenders
a fugitive from justice. 31 AM. JuR. 2D Extradition § 21 (1989). Today comity is
rarely used due to the numerous extradition conventions and treaties to which
the United States is a party. Id.
The requirements of dual criminality and specialty have posed problems for
the United States in seeking extradition from some countries. Other countries,
such as Iran and Afghanistan, do not have treaties with the United States. The
United States on some occasions has resorted to more expedient methods of
apprehension, such as irregular rendition and abduction, but these methods
raise a host of other diplomatic problems. See generally Sandi R. Murphy, Note,
Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of United States Prac-
tice, 43 VAD. L. REv. 1259, 1294-1300 (1990) (discussing extraordinary meth-
ods of apprehension of foreign offenders).
169. The civil forfeiture statutes as we know them today are usually consid-
ered to have originated from British admiralty law. In disputes between mari-
time traders, the owners of the vessels were likely to live abroad and thus
outside the jurisdiction of the court. The in rem civil action provided a conve-
nient way to resolve maritime disputes. See Stahl, supra note 9, at 295; see also
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (stating that of three types of
forfeiture used in England, only statutory forfeitures such as those found in the
navigation acts and used to enforce revenue or customs laws took hold in this
country).
The principle of forfeiture of guilty property has been traced back to biblical
times. For a thorough discussion of forfeitures and deodands, see Jacob J. Fin-
kelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeit-
ures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169
(1973).
170. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
171. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
172. Apparently, the private parties who had been victimized could claim
the property so acquired by the government. Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at
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prosecute the owner of the Palmyra for the actions of the
crew,173 if indeed the government could have shown that the
owner had commissioned the crimes, the government brought a
civil forfeiture action under the Piracy Act of 1819 instead. Jus-
tice Story's majority opinion in Malek Adhel comments on the
necessity rationale for bringing civil actions in rem:
It is not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law of
nations, to treat the vessel in which or by which, or by the master or
crew thereof, a wrong or [offense] has been done as the offender, with-
out any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility
of the owner thereof. And this is done from the necessity of the case, as
the only adequate means of suppressing the [offense] or wrong, or in-
suring an indemnity to the injured party. The doctrine also is famil-
iarly applied to cases of smuggling and other misconduct .... 174
These early cases, then, responded to an otherwise un-
remediable situation by proceeding against the property of a for-
eign owner to provide some recompense to American victims of
piracy. Similarly, in the smuggling cases, forfeiture of the vessel
that transported the contraband provided the only means of
punishing and deterring the foreign ship owner from smuggling.
There was a need for an extraordinary measure to allow the gov-
ernment to punish a person over whom the government could
not obtain personal jurisdiction. The fiction of the in rem pro-
ceeding-the action directly against the offending property it-
self-lent itself to the situation.
As a policy matter, modern civil drug asset forfeitures
should continue to be allowed to punish extraterritorial defend-
ants. Congress should address this problem directly, however,
by enacting a special provision that would allow the civil forfei-
ture of any property of a suspected drug offender who is outside
the jurisdiction of American courts. Given the international na-
ture of the drug trade, a drug dealer's assets may be located
within the United States while the offending owner is abroad or
has become a fugitive. Although the government can prove an
individual committed a drug offense in the United States, if the
individual cannot be found within the United States borders, a
civil action against the property of the individual may provide
the only practical recourse for the enforcement of the drug
laws.175
233. This feature has not been retained in modem civil drug asset forfeitures.
See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 166.
174. Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233.
175. See supra note 166.
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Civil drug asset forfeiture laws, however, authorize forfei-
ture in the routine case in which the government will also prose-
cute a defendant criminally.' 7 6 The authority to entertain a
civil drug asset forfeiture action does not turn on the existence of
in personam jurisdiction over the alleged criminal. In the rou-
tine case, forfeitures should be limited to those involving purely
remedial ends.' 7 7 In contrast, both punitive and remedial forfei-
ture should be allowed in cases of extraterritorial suspects.' 7 8
These changes should not have any bearing on interagency
cooperation.' 7 9 To the extent that future revenues might de-
crease, any decrease would most likely reflect a correction of
previous forfeitures that courts allowed prior to the Austin re-
quirement of proportionality review. If the decrease that this
correction causes is so drastic as to leave law enforcement inade-
quately funded, the legislature always has the option of direct
federal finding.
B. RESERVING PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL COURTS
By restricting punitive forfeitures except as criminal
sentences, 80 Congress could consolidate the punishment phase
for drug offenses into a single sentencing proceeding held in
criminal court after conviction. For reasons of judicial economy
alone, one might expect the government to prefer a single, con-
solidated criminal action to determine guilt or innocence and to
decide the extent of punishment to be imposed. Consolidation of
the punishment phases in one post-conviction sentencing pro-
ceeding will allow courts to make better-informed, rational
decisions.
176. In Austin, for example, the defendant had already been convicted and
sentenced in state criminal court before the federal government initiated a civil
forfeiture action against his home and business. Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).
177. See supra part III.B.
178. Situations may arise in which property is forfeited in a punitive civil
case on the ground that the suspect has become a fugitive or is an unex-
traditable foreign national, and later the government obtains in personam ju-
risdiction and files a criminal action. Procedures for discounting the criminal
sentence by the amount of the punitive forfeiture can be devised, although sub-
sequent prosecution may run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause. See infra notes 180-196 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
180. The proposal that this Article sets forth would allow the continued use
of punitive forfeiture in cases in which the suspected drug offender is outside
the jurisdictional reach of the court or has become a fugitive. See supra Part
IVWA
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At present, prosecutors in many drug cases seek civil drug
asset forfeitures prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings.
Because sentencing occurs after the civil forfeiture proceeding,
the government has already seized whatever assets the person
once owned by the time he or she is sentenced. This eliminates
the possibility of imposing any financial penalty as a criminal
sentence. At sentencing, the court reviews a Probation Officer's
pre-sentence investigation report which frequently reports an
"inability to pay" fines, without necessarily indicating to the
court that the defendant's poverty is the result of civil forfei-
ture.'81 The sentencing court then determines the applicable
imprisonment range and forgoes any financial penalty or asset
forfeiture.
This Article proposes that only criminal courts should im-
pose punitive sanctions. Drug offenders who possess real prop-
erty or conveyances would face forfeiture of these assets through
criminal forfeiture, in addition to the possibility of a monetary
fine and prison sentence. Together with consolidating and ratio-
nalizing criminal sentencing, this proposal offers two other ad-
vantages. First, it avoids the double jeopardy challenges that
inevitably will follow from the Austin decision that characterizes
certain forfeitures as punishment. Furthermore, it provides
criminal courts with a new and potentially potent sentencing op-
tion that could reduce the need for incarceration. The following
sections address these advantages and also consider the costs of
overpunishment that society will continue to bear if reform is
not forthcoming.
1. Double Jeopardy Considerations
The Austin decision may foretell a future Court ruling that
the Double Jeopardy Clause permits punishment for a crime to
be imposed either at a civil forfeiture proceeding or at sentenc-
ing, but not both. 182 The Court noted in Austin that the Double
Jeopardy Clause had not been applied in civil forfeiture cases,
181. Presentence investigation reports give courts additional information
pertinent to the sentencing decision. Probation officers are required to prepare
these reports in every case. See FED. R. CRni. P. 32(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
182. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that, "Nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V. In addition, to prohibiting double prosecution, the clause
also provides protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 (1990) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849
(1993).
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and, almost in passing, added, "but only in cases where the for-
feiture could properly be characterized as remedial."183 It fol-
lows logically from the Court's finding that the forfeiture of real
property and conveyances are punitive, and that civil forfeiture
of these items in addition to criminal sentencing violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause.-84
When the government brings both a criminal action and a
civil forfeiture action in a drug case,' 8 5 the question is whether
the second punishment constitutes multiple punishment for the
same offense.' 8 6 Until recently, the test articulated in United
183. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4 (citing United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984)); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (per curiam); see generally United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-49 (1989) (holding Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits a second sanction that may not fairly be characterized as remedial).
184. It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
three types of abuses of prosecutorial power: a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after convic-
tion, and multiple punishments for the same offense. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440;
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165
(1977); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.
185. It makes no difference for double jeopardy purposes whether the crimi-
nal case is brought before the civil case or vice-versa. See Philip S. Khinda,
Undesired Results Under Halper and Grady: Double Jeopardy Bars on Crimi-
nal RICO Actions Against Civilly-Sanctioned Defendants, 25 COLUM. J. L. Soc.
PROBS. 117, 148 (1991).
186. Presumably, the civil and criminal cases are predicated on the "same
offense." The Supreme Court set forth the approach for interpreting the phrase
"same offense" in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Block-
burger decision states that "the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not." Id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S.
338, 342 (1911)); see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (holding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause bars prosecution for lesser included offense and greater offense).
Because civil forfeitures are premised on proof of a violation of the criminal
drug laws, prosecution for the same criminal law will clearly constitute the
same offense. For example, the forfeiture of conveyances requires proof that
the vehicles were "used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner
to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment" of con-
trolled substances or the materials used to manufacture or transport them. 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988).
Of course, prosecutors might try to fashion their cases so that two different
provisions of Title 21 are the bases for the civil and criminal cases. For exam-
ple, the prosecutor might premise the civil forfeiture action on the possession of
drug manufacturing equipment and might premise the criminal indictment on
the drug sale, even though only one transaction is at issue. The Coures deci-
sion in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), eliminated this loophole, but was
recently overruled. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2852 (1993).
In Grady, the Court created a second double jeopardy requirement. Even if
the offenses satisfied the Blockburger test, Grady held that, in addition, the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred any subsequent prosecution in which the
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States v. Ward determined whether a civil sanction constituted a
punishment or a remedy.'8 7 In effect, the Ward test makes the
Double Jeopardy Clause inapplicable unless a court finds that
Congress did not mean what it said when it labeled a statute
"civil," a finding courts should be reluctant to make. 88
The landmark case of United States v. Halper discarded this
approach and applied the double jeopardy clause to a civil pro-
ceeding for the first time.'8 9 The civil statute in Halper could in
charge requires proof of "conduct that constitutes an offense for which the de-
fendant has already been prosecuted." Grady, 495 U.S. at 521. The decision in
Dixon again focuses the inquiry on a technical analysis of the elements of the
statutes charged, rather than on the actual conduct involved. See generally
Khinda, supra note 185 (criticizing the Grady approach and suggesting it re-
sults in chilling impracticalities for law enforcement authorities); George C.
Thomas, IH, A Modest Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69 WASH.
U. L.Q. 195 (1991) (proposing to narrow Grady's "same culpability" test);
Ramona L. McGee, Note, Criminal RICO and Double Jeopardy Analysis in the
Wake of Grady v. Corbin Is This RICO's Achilles' Heel?, 77 CommmL L. REv.
687 (1992) (analyzing the Grady test as applied to RICO).
187. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Two Supreme Court cases examined the applica-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeiture actions brought after ac-
quittals on criminal charges arising from the same offenses. United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the Court considered whether the forfei-
ture constituted a second "criminal punishment." 409 U.S. at 235. Thus, both
the criminal and the punitive nature of the statute were at issue. The Court
found the statute was serving a remedial purpose in providing "a reasonable
form of liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions and
serv[ing] to reimburse the Government for investigation and enforcement ex-
penses." Id. at 237. The second issue was whether the measure of recovery was
"so unreasonable or excessive that it transform[ed] what was clearly intended
as a civil remedy into a criminal punishment." The court held it was not. Id.
By the time the Court decided One Assortment of 89 Firearms in 1984, it
had developed the Ward test for distinguishing civil from criminal statutes,
which it found critical to the double jeopardy inquiry. United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-169 (1963) (listing factors relevant to the punitive-remedial analysis).
This test does not differ substantially from the One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
test, although it is somewhat more exacting because it incorporates the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors. See supra note 135 (listing seven factors).
188. The test requires courts to determine Congress's intent in enacting the
law, and if they find the intent was to create a civil remedy, then courts are
required to consider whether the statute is "'so punitive... as to negate' Con-
gress' intent to establish a civil remedial mechanism." One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). The Ward test has
also been used to determine whether other constitutional provisions were appli-
cable. See supra note 135.
189. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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no way be construed as criminal under the Ward test.190 Yet the
particular application of the statute resulted in a fine well in
excess of that which would be appropriate to meet the govern-
ment's remedial purposes.191 Thus, had the Court applied the
Ward test in Halper, the government would not have been
barred from imposing both criminal punishment and the large
civil fine, even though the civil fine could only be construed as
punitive.
The Halper decision frames the "sole question" as "whether
the statutory penalty ... constitutes a second 'punishment' for
the purpose of double jeopardy analysis."192 The Court disposed
of prior case law by finding their "relevant teaching" to be "that
the Government is entitled to rough remedial justice" and that it
may use "imprecise formulas" to fix damages "without being
deemed to have imposed a second punishment."193
Moreover, the Court rejected the Ward approach as "not
well suited to the context of the 'humane interests' safeguarded
by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple pun-
ishment"; thus, "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of para-
mount importance." 194 The Court instead applied a "rule of
reason":
Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and
the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but
rather appears to qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the
word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Govern-
ment's damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact
constitutes a second punishment.195
190. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731, provides a remedy for
the filing of false claims and imposes liability for a civil penalty of "not less than
$5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times the amount of damages the
Government sustains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil
action." 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988). The Court stated this provision should ordi-
narily be construed as a civil remedial measure. 490 U.S. at 449 ("Similarly, we
have recognized that in the ordinary case fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages
provisions can be said to do no more than make the Government whole.").
191. As manager of New City Medical Laboratories, Irwin Halper submitted
false claims to an insurance company for reimbursement for services rendered
on 65 separate occasions. The claims demanded reimbursement in the amount
of $12 each, when the actual service only entitled the laboratory to $3 per claim.
490 U.S. at 437. The insurance company passed the overcharges along to the
federal Medicare program. The total sum of the overcharges was $585. Id.
Under the formula for fines of the False Claims Act, Halper was subject to a
fine of over $130,000. Id. at 438.
192. Id. at 441.
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id. at 447.
195. Id. at 449-50.
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Applying the Halper approach, it follows that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause would bar the imposition of punitive civil forfeitures
in combination with a second punishment in criminal court. 196
2. Criminal Forfeiture as an Intermediate Punishment
In the ordinary case, the government should bring punitive
forfeitures as part of the criminal sentence. Section 853 already
requires courts to forfeit a defendant's assets upon conviction for
a drug offense, but the current structure does not distinguish
between remedial and punitive forfeitures, nor does it give the
sentencing court the discretion to fashion sentences consistent
with the defendant's ability to bear the financial penalty. 97
Courts should allow punitive forfeitures in criminal court only to
the extent that they reflect the severity of the offense, as the
Austin case implies. 198 Consistent with the Court's determina-
tion that the forfeiture of conveyances and real property used to
facilitate offenses constitute punishment for crime, Congress
should amend § 853 to distinguish between remedial and puni-
tive forfeitures. The sentencing structure should fully incorpo-
rate those forfeitures that serve to punish, giving courts much
more discretion to choose between types of punishment than the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines presently allow.' 99 Punitive
196. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Court also ignored the
Ward test in its excessive fines analysis in Austin. See supra note 135 and ac-
companying text. The Court has shown a preference for the punitive-remedial
test for judging civil penalties under both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
Excessive Fines Clause. It stands to reason that the Court will apply the same
analysis to its double jeopardy analysis of punitive forfeitures.
In cases in which the federal government initiates a punitive forfeiture ac-
tion and the state court files a criminal action based on the same offense, as was
the case in Austin, the Court may find that the "dual sovereignty exception" to
the Double Jeopardy Clause allows the imposition of the second punishment.
Although a thorough exploration of this exception is beyond the scope of this
Article, see generally Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty Exception
To Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 383 (1986) (analyzing
the historical development and contemporary significance of the dual sover-
eignty exception to double jeopardy).
197. For a description of the scope and operation of the criminal forfeiture
provisions of Title 21, see supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
198. See supra part LI.B (discussing the Austin decision).
199. The guidelines applicable to drug offenses reflect the mandatory mini-
mum sentences that Congress created, which require lengthy prison terms for
all drug offenses. See Freed, supra note 7, at 1690 n.45; Gary T. Lowenthal,
Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 86-87 (1993).
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criminal forfeitures could serve as intermediate sanctions 200 in
the same way that fines could be punishment for crimes. 20 '
The suggestion that courts should factor forfeitures into the
sentencing decision raises the same equity concerns that have
prevented fine programs from being implemented as meaningful
intermediate sanctions. The suggested use of financial penalties
to punish for crimes is inevitably criticized as unfair to the indi-
gent on the ground that the poor could not benefit from this op-
tion and would be subject to incarceration instead. Although a
full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article,
Professors Norval Morris and Michael Tonry thoroughly ex-
plored and flatly rejected this concern in their book, Between
Prison And Probation.20 2
Professors Morris and Tonry believe that using financial
penalties interchangeably with incarceration does not pose an
equity problem. 20 3 Their sensible proposal would tailor the fi-
nancial penalty to each offender's means, earning capacity, and
financial obligations to dependents, so as to impose "roughly
200. "Intermediate sanctions," sometimes called "alternatives to incarcera-
tion," comprise punishment options that lie between the fully incapacitating
option of imprisonment and the option of ordinary probation, which is thought
to impose few restrictions on an offender's liberty. Intermediate sanctions in-
clude fines, community service orders, house arrest, intermittent imprison-
ment, electronic monitoring, and probation with conditions such as requiring
treatment. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PRO.
BATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 176-
80 (1990) (listing menu of punishment options).
201. The typical understanding of the purpose of fines is to punish and deter
crime, not to serve as a means of dispossessing criminals of ill-gotten gains,
which would be a purely remedial purpose. See SALLY T. HImLSMAN ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINES IN SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE USE OF THE FINE AS A
CRIMINAL SANCTION 21-28 (Nov. 1984).
202. See MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note 200, at 82-149 (exploring the in-
terchangeablity of punishments and the use of fines as an intermediate
punishment).
203. They persuasively argue in favor of the interchangability of punish-
ments both in principle and in practice. MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note 200, at
35-108.
The Supreme Court has struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause the use of incarceration in lieu of payment of fines by poor people. The
Court held such laws worked an invidious discrimination against individuals on
the basis of indigency. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674 (1983); Tate
v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243-44
(1970).
Financial penalties tailored to a person's means, with the alternative of
community service for the truly indigent, would avoid the equal protection is-
sues in those cases. See Richard Posner, Optimal Criminal Sanctions, in ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205, 209 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing Supreme Court
decisions in Tate and Williams were incorrect).
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comparable financial burdens."20 4 As between rich and poor de-
fendants, the dollar amounts of fines or forfeitures may vary
even if their criminal histories and offenses of conviction are the
same. This inequality is not problematic if our concern is to ex-
act the same amount of punishment. Courts can only impose
roughly equivalent financial hardships on rich and poor defend-
ants by making rich defendants pay more than poor ones. 20 5
The use of financial penalties to punish poor people poses no
practical problems either. Studies of fine collection programs in-
dicate that even relatively poor people pay their fines as or-
dered.20 6 With the addition of criminal forfeiture as an
204. MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note 200, at 114, 141. Congress requires the
consideration of these and other factors in determining the ability of a defend-
ant to pay a fine. The relevant provision of the Sentencing Reform Act reads as
follows:
In determining whether to impose a fine, and the amount, time for pay-
ment, and method of payment of a fine, the court shall consider, in
addition to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)-
(1) the defendant's income, earning capacity, and financial resources;
(2) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant, any per-
son who is financially dependent on the defendant, or any other person
(including a government) that would be responsible for the welfare of
any person financially dependent on the defendant, relative to the bur-
den that alternative punishments would impose;
(3) any pecuniary loss inflicted upon others as a result of the offense;
(4) whether restitution is ordered or made and the amount of such
restitution;
(5) the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from
the offense;
(6) whether the defendant can pass on to consumers or other persons
the expense of the fine; and
(7) if the defendant is an organization, the size of the organization and
any measure taken by the organization to discipline any officer, direc-
tor, employee, or agent of the organization responsible for the offense
and to prevent a recurrence of such an offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (1988).
205. We can learn much from the day fine systems of the Swedish and
Germans in thinking about structuring a system of financial penalties. As sum-
marized by Morris and Tonry, "'t]he number of day-fine units must be decided
first by the sentencing court without regard to the means of the offender; the
value of each day-fine unit is them calculated." MORRIS & ToNRY, supra note
200, at 143. In practice, the Swedish and German systems operate very differ-
ently due to the difference in the way they calculate the offender's ability to
pay. Id. These and other American day fine models should influence the devel-
opment of an integrated punishment system for drug offenders as well as other
types of offenders.
206. Morris and Tonry reject the idea that the poor cannot pay fines, and
give numerous examples of successful programs that have calibrated fines ac-
cording to an offender's ability to pay. Id. at 112-15; see also SILVIA S.G. CASALE
& SALLY T. HILISMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ENFORCEMENT OF FINEs AS
CRImINAL SANCTIONS: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO AMERI-
CAN PRACTICE (Nov. 1986) (concluding that fines can be collected from even poor
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intermediate sanction, courts would have the option of a finan-
cial penalty that would not entail any enforcement problems be-
cause they would know about the defendant's assets at
sentencing and forfeiture could occur immediately after sentenc-
ing. The utterly destitute would not necessarily suffer more se-
vere punishment under this type of system. Even the poorest
defendants can have a "fine on time" imposed, such as commu-
nity service, rather than a financial penalty.20 7
A drug sentence might include a package of punishments
such as a period of incarceration, fines, or forfeiture of assets
such as cars and other items, and perhaps other intermediate
sanctions such as community service. Courts can fashion inter-
mediate sanctions to reflect the seriousness of the offense while
reducing reliance on prison sentences to the exclusion of other
forms of punishment.20 Because many drug offenders do not
pose a threat of violence requiring incapacitation, this group is
appropriately targeted for intermediate sanctions.20 9
The imposition of financial penalties on drug offenders
would not change existing policy. Congress has already en-
dorsed the efficacy of financial disincentives for drug offenders
when it enacted the civil and criminal forfeiture and criminal
offenders when set rationally in relation to means based on a study of English
courts); HrLSMAN ET. AL., supra note 201 (discussing the use of fines in other
countries; DOUGLAS C. McDONALD ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DAY FINES IN
AMERICAN COURTS: THE STATEN ISLAND AND MILWAUKEE EXPERIMENTS (Apr.
1992) (reporting results of an experiment using day fines that tailor an of-
fender's fine to his or her ability to pay); George F. Cole, Fines Can Be Fine-
and Collected, 28 JUDGES' J. at 5 (Winter 1989) (arguing for greater use of fines
as sanctions in criminal cases).
207. See MoRRIs & TONRY, supra note 200, at 123-24.
208. Good sense and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the
Sentencing Commission and charged it with the creation of Guidelines, require
these considerations. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988). The Act charges the Commission to "insure that the guide-
lines reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately
reflect the seriousness of the offense." § 994(m). The statute also requires the
Commission to "take into account the nature and capacity of the penal, correc-
tional, and other facilities and services available" in promulgating guidelines.
§ 994(g).
209. See J. Michael Quinlan, Intermediate Punishments as Sentencing Op-
tions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 217 (1992) (former director of Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons advocating increased reliance on intermediate sanctions for non-violent
offenders to redress overcrowding that stiffer laws cause). In Sweden in 1979,
courts imposed fines in 734 narcotics cases, and in significant numbers of other
serious offenses such as homicide, sexual offenses, and robbery. MoRRs &
TONRY, supra note 200, at 144.
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fine provisions.210 The changes suggested here would merely ac-
knowledge that punitive forfeitures are punishment for crime in
the hopes of encouraging a more comprehensive analysis of drug
sentencing.
CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for a comprehensive approach to drug sen-
tencing in federal court. The plethora of recent Supreme Court
forfeiture decisions indicates a desire on the Court's part to reex-
amine the entire civil forfeiture process. The decisions of the Oc-
tober 1992 term, in particular, will work substantial changes in
the way drug offense forfeitures operate, specifically the Austin
requirement of proportionality review. Rather than making
piecemeal changes to conform the civil forfeiture process to sat-
isfy the mandates of the Supreme Court, however, Congress
should thoroughly investigate the relationship between the
criminal sentencing and civil forfeiture processes. Only a single,
comprehensive system of punishment will rationalize drug sen-
tencing in federal court.
A few simple changes in the civil forfeiture law would re-
strict the imposition of punitive forfeitures except as criminal
sentences. These changes would consolidate the imposition of
punishment into one criminal sentencing forum. This would
eliminate the problem of excessive punishment that occurs when
drug offenders receive punishment through both the criminal
and civil courts for the same offense. These changes would also
eliminate the possible double jeopardy dilemma in this arrange-
ment. Congress could easily fashion procedures to protect the
210. The 1986 Act that raised drug offense fines to millions of dollars pro-
duced no legislative history on the rationale for the increases. The legislative
history of an earlier amendment increasing the drug offense fine provisions,
however, suggests that the legislative intent of the increase was to deprive drug
offenders of illegitimate profits. In 1984, Congress increased fines for drug of-
fenses from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands for the follow-
ing purpose:
Drug trafficking is enormously profitable. Yet current fine levels are,
in relation to the illicit profits generated, woefully inadequate. It is not
uncommon for a major drug transaction to produce profits in the hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars. However, with the exception of the most
recently enacted penalty for domestic distribution of large amounts of
marihuana, the maximum fine that may be imposed is $25,000. Part A
of Title V provides more realistic fine levels that can serve as appropri-
ate punishments for, and deterrents to, these tremendously lucrative
crimes.




properties subject to criminal forfeiture from being transferred
or hidden, thereby satisfying an important concern of law en-
forcement. At the same time, the availability of punitive forfeit-
ures as an intermediate sanction creates another sentencing
option that could serve as a means of reducing our reliance on
imprisonment.
Impressive advances in the investigation and prosecution of
drug crimes by prosecutors and law enforcement officials have
gone unnoticed due to all the negative publicity given to cases of
forfeiture abuses. Of special significance are the multi-jurisdic-
tional task forces that have effectively coordinated the efforts of
law enforcement on all levels of government. These institutional
coalitions were born out of a desire to curb the drug trade, but
can serve as models for multi-jurisdictional cooperation to at-
tack other pervasive problems. Statutory changes would pro-
mote a fairer and more rational system and would allow the
public to focus on the positive aspects of drug control in this
country.
Most importantly, a comprehensive assessment of the pun-
ishment of drug offenders could address the concerns of over-
punishment that have resulted in overcrowded federal prisons
and numerous other unfortunate consequences. It is not only
drug offenders who suffer when the system inflicts excessive
punishment. We all pay the price, and we cannot afford to con-
tinue on this course. In particular, forfeitures of real property,
although not requiring financial outlays, nonetheless have social
costs. When legitimate businesses are forfeited to the govern-
ment, innocent employees lose their jobs. They suffer emotional
harm and the financial strain of unemployment, and they may
require welfare support. When the homes of drug offenders are
forfeited, their families may be left homeless.
The logic of current sentencing practices is analogous to the
fallacious belief that if two aspirins will cure a headache in an
hour, four aspirins will cure it in half of an hour. No amount of
punishment will ever "cure" our drug problem, but one thing is
certain: an overdose of punishment does more harm than good.
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